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OUR PRESCRIPTIVE JUDICIAL POWER: CONSTITUTIVE
AND ENTRENCHMENT EFFECTS OF HISTORICAL
PRACTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS LAW
ERNEST A. YOUNG*
ABSTRACT
Scholars examining the use of historical practice in constitutional
adjudication have focused on a few high-profile separation of powers
disputes, such as the recent decisions in NLRB v. Noel Canning and
Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This Article argues that “big cases make bad
theory”—that the focus on high-profile cases of this type distorts our
understanding of how historical practice figures into constitutional
adjudication more generally. I shift focus here to the more prosaic
terrain of federal courts law, where practice plays a pervasive role.
That shift reveals two important insights: First, while historical
practice plays an important constitutive role structuring and filling
gaps in the judicial architecture, that practice is, in contrast to the
practices in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky, rarely entrenched against
ordinary legal change. Second, the authority of historical practice in
high-profile separation of powers disputes generally rests on a theory
of acquiescence by one branch in the other’s actions; the federal
courts cases, in contrast, ignore acquiescence and instead ground
practice’s authority in its longstanding observance.
The use of historical practice in federal courts law rests on a theory
of prescription—that is, past practice derives authority from its sheer
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This Article was originally
presented at the Duke Law School Federal Courts Roundtable on “Historical Practice and the
Federal Judicial Power,” held on October 23, 2015. I am grateful to Curt Bradley and Neil
Siegel for organizing the roundtable and inviting me to attend, to Hope Staneski for research
assistance, and to participants at that roundtable and at the Vanderbilt faculty colloquium,
and especially Henry Monaghan, Kevin Stack, and Amelia DeGory for their helpful comments
on the manuscript. 
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pastness. This Article explores the centrality of prescription in Burk-
ean political theory and suggests that cases relying on past practices
can contribute to the development of a distinctively Burkean theory
of constitutional law. This theory suggests that past practice plays an
important constitutive role, but, as in the federal courts cases, that
role is not entrenched against ordinary legal change. The fact that
historical practice is not entrenched—and can be changed through
democratic processes—helps to answer several key criticisms of
relying on practice in constitutional adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION
A spate of recent, high-profile separation of powers cases at the
Supreme Court has turned a spotlight on courts’ reliance on histor-
ical practice in constitutional cases. In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the
Court looked to the practice of past Presidents and Congresses in
resolving three questions about the meaning of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause.1 Likewise, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court relied on
executive practice and Congress’s acquiescence to determine that
Congress may not regulate the President’s power to recognize (or
not recognize) the territorial claims of foreign governments.2 These
and other cases have prompted an outpouring of scholarship con-
cerning the courts’ reliance on historical practice outside the usual
parameters of originalist interpretation—that is, the use of histor-
ical practices that are not evidence of the Founders’ intentions or
understandings but that nonetheless may help resolve disputed
questions of constitutional meaning.3
In this Article, I suggest that high-profile disputes over the sep-
aration of powers can tell us only part of the story concerning the
role of historical practice in constitutional analysis. I shift focus
from separation of powers disputes to the somewhat more prosaic
terrain of federal courts law.4 That field, to be sure, has its share of
1. See 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014) (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause
permits appointments during both inter- and intra-session recesses and covers vacancies that
arise prior to the recess but does not permit appointments when the Senate is in pro forma
session).
2. See 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2093-94, 2096 (2015) (holding that Congress may not require the
Secretary of State to designate “Israel” as the place of birth on a passport issued to a citizen
born in Jerusalem, in contravention of executive policy).
3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 56-65; Curtis A.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 411, 412-13 (2012); Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
668, 702-10 (2016).
4. By “federal courts law,” I mean the body of law governing the jurisdiction and reme-
dial powers of the federal judiciary, as well as that judiciary’s interaction with state law and
state courts. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Para-
digm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 961-63 (1994) (discussing the somewhat fuzzy boundaries of the
federal courts field). I also construe the term to include recurrent institutional problems aris-
ing in federal litigation, such as the federal courts’ stance toward statutes and their own pre-
cedents. These are not exclusively problems of federal courts law, but they are much-discussed
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high-stakes, interbranch confrontations—for example, over Con-
gress’s authority to restrict the federal courts’ jurisdiction.5 But
federal courts doctrine often looks to historical practice in less
dramatic ways. Consider, for example, a typical civil rights suit
against a state officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreason-
able search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In
adjudicating such a case, a court is likely to frame the plaintiff ’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of common social prac-
tices;6 to look to common law practice in assessing both the measure
of damages7 and the defendant’s official immunity;8 and to assess
the availability of an injunction against future intrusions in light of
the traditions of equity.9
Because it focuses on high-profile separation of powers disputes,
the existing literature on historical practice in constitutional ad-
judication tends to ignore the sort of case just described. But
practice is in fact pervasive in federal courts law. That body of law
borrows from the common law and equity practice in shaping ju-
dicial procedure and remedies;10 it employs canons of statutory
construction designed, at bottom, to harmonize new law with long-
standing practice;11 and it structures the intricate relationship
in that field.
5. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (striking down restrictions on
judicial review of determinations that Guantanamo Bay detainees were enemy combatants
under the Suspension Clause); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13, 515 (1868)
(upholding a restriction on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review challenges to military
reconstruction of the South, albeit noting other avenues of appeal).
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978).
8. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). Although Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982), extended qualified immunity beyond the scope of the common law, later cases
have made clear that the common law remains highly relevant, especially when immunity
claims are made in new contexts. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404-07 (1997)
(considering historical practice and the common law in rejecting qualified immunity claimed
by prison guards employed by a private contractor); Tower, 467 U.S. at 921 (considering an
immunity claim by a public defender in light of the common law immunities of English
barristers).
9. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).
10. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (grounding state sovereign
immunity in the English common law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908) (rec-
ognizing private remedies against state officials, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, based
in part on traditions of equitable relief against government officials in English practice).
11. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925-26 (1992).
540 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:535
between the federal and state judicial systems by constant reference
to longstanding usage.12 These sorts of reliance on past practice
differ in important ways from use of practice in cases like Noel
Canning or Zivotofsky. Practice in federal courts law often bears a
different relationship to the constitutional text, for example, and it
rests on a different justificatory rationale. I submit that we miss a
lot about historical practice by focusing only on the high-profile
cases. One might thus sum up the line taken here as “big cases
make bad theory”—or at least incomplete theory.
Shifting the focus to federal courts law and the judicial power
entails a second analytical move as well. This Article considers a
variety of ways in which historical practices influence judicial deci-
sion-making—including judges’ reliance on past precedents, their
incorporation of preexisting common law or equitable doctrines to
fill numerous gaps in our procedural and remedial regime, and the
employment of canons of statutory construction—that are sub-
constitutional in nature. One might say that these practices are all
“constitutional” in that they involve constructions of the “judicial
power” recognized in Article III.13 But while that is true, it also
seems a bit broad. It is more precise to say that these practices each
perform a constitutional function—they help constitute the judicial
power that Article III incompletely specifies—and thus form part of
our “constitution outside the Constitution.”14 This notion, that the
canonical text of the Constitution includes only a subset of the
principles that constitute our government, goes back at least as far
as Karl Llewellyn’s idea of a “working constitution” in 1934.15 I build
12. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (relying on longstanding equitable
principles to forbid federal judicial interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 624 (1874) (rejecting arguments that an
amendment to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute was intended to fundamentally alter
the relationship between that court and the state courts). 
13. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir.) (suggesting that
stare decisis is part of the meaning of the “judicial power”), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000).
14. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408,
415, 420 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Outside the Constitution].
15. See Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1934).
The notion that a constitution functionally includes all the legal materials that define,
facilitate, and constrain a government’s exercise of its powers is commonplace in British law,
which has long defined the “Constitution” as simply the sum of these materials. See A.V.
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 22-23 (5th ed. 1897).
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on that notion here to suggest that any effort to assess the courts’
reliance on historical practice in public law should include not only
its use to resolve controversies about the constitutional text but also
the broader set of practices that constitute much of our working
system of governance. Federal courts law provides particularly fer-
tile ground for that broader assessment.
My exploration of the courts’ reliance on historical practice in the
context of disputes about the judicial power yields two primary
conclusions. The first is that using such practices to interpret the
meaning of particular constitutional terms—which I will call his-
torical “gloss”—is probably not the most common or the most
important role that historical practice plays. When courts use prac-
tice to “gloss” a constitutional term, they tend to entrench that
practice against change through ordinary legal means. Hence, in
Zivotofsky, the majority read past practice by the President either
recognizing or refusing to recognize territorial claims of foreign
governments as a gloss on the meaning of Executive power, such
that Congress could not regulate that practice by statute.16
Constitutionalizing past practices dramatically raises the stakes of
that kind of interpretation and may create all sorts of perverse
incentives.
Much use of practice in federal courts law, however, supplements
the text by filling in the many gaps in Article III’s plan for the
judicial system. Critically, historical practice that supplements the
constitutional text need not be—and generally is not—itself
constitutionally entrenched. The jurisprudential literature on
constitutional functions distinguishes between the constitutive
function (establishing, empowering, and limiting governmental
institutions) and the entrenchment function (immunizing those
institutions from change through ordinary legal processes).17
Much—but not all—of the historical usage pervading federal courts
law performs a constitutive function but remains subject to change
through ordinary legislation. Current law’s borrowing of common
16. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).
17. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998); Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 415-28.
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law principles of official immunity,18 for example, can be changed
through statutory enactment.19 Incorporation of historical practice
tends to be most controversial when this is not the case—when, for
example, common law immunities are given entrenched constitu-
tional status.20
My second point is that reliance on historical practice in federal
courts law frequently rests on a justificatory basis different from the
rationales featured in cases like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. Those
cases—and much of the academic literature that has grown up
around them—speak primarily of rival institutions’ acquiescence in
a particular branch’s exercise of power.21 Much of the reliance on
historical usage that I explore here, however, occurs in contexts in
which acquiescence seems largely beside the point. Instead, the turn
to practice rests on more amorphous notions that past usage has its
own legitimacy, if not authority, based on its very pastness. Much
reliance on historical practice in this area, I suggest, invokes a form
of prescription.
Edmund Burke famously said that “[p]rescription is the most
solid of all titles, not only to property, but ... to government.... It is
a presumption in favour of any settled scheme of government
against any untried project, that a nation has long existed and flour-
ished under it.”22 Burke went so far as to insist that the authority
of traditional practice “is a better presumption even of the choice of
a nation, far better than any sudden and temporary arrangement by
actual election.”23 Customary practice and prescriptive wisdom have
long played an important role in American constitutionalism, but
they remain underappreciated in constitutional theory. Reliance on
18. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806 (1982).
19. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 920 (“On its face § 1983 admits no immunities.”).
20. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-66 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for conferring constitutional status on state sovereign
immunity that forecloses alteration by statute).
21. See, e.g., Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091; NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2571-
72 (2014); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 54 (“Under most accounts of historical
gloss, there must be some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of
government in order for the practice to be credited.”); Roisman, supra note 3, at 669-71.
22. Edmund Burke, Speech on Parliamentary Reform (June 16, 1784), in 4 THE WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 215, 219 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press 2015)
[hereinafter Burke, Parliamentary Reform].
23. Id.
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tradition has been criticized from multiple directions as either too
easy to manipulate (and therefore a cover for judicial activism)24 or
too confining (and therefore likely to lock in an unjust status quo).25
And from a more positivist standpoint, reliance on historical
practice in constitutional interpretation arguably permits changes
in constitutional meaning that circumvent both Article V’s amend-
ment process and more general limits on judicial lawmaking.26
Distinguishing between the constitutive and entrenchment as-
pects of constitutionalism helps to address these criticisms. Much
past practice in the federal courts field derives its authority from
longstanding usage, largely independent of legitimation through
some form of acquiescence. But because little of that practice is
entrenched against legal change, it simply does not raise the same
concerns about “constitutional adverse possession” that arise when
historical practice is used to “gloss” the meaning of constitutional
text. The weight of the “dead hand of the past”27 is less oppressive
when past practices are subject to legislative override.
Conversely, the incremental and evolutionary reform that pre-
scription also entails is easier to defend when it does not involve
change in the meaning of entrenched constitutional principles and
structures. I do not deny that courts make law when, for example,
they import common law or equitable principles to define the scope
of federal jurisdiction or recognize and limit remedies against gov-
ernment actors. This sort of judicial lawmaking—the subject of an
extensive literature on federal common law—raises legitimacy
problems of its own.28 But the courts do not circumvent Article V so
long as they do not seek to confer any sort of entrenched status on
24. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1990).
25. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1699, 1708 (1991) [hereinafter Strauss, Tradition].
26. See, e.g., Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that by relying on ambiguous historical practice rather than the constitutional text,
“[t]he majority replaces the Constitution’s text with a new set of judge-made rules to govern
recess appointments”).
27. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1998) (discussing the “dead hand problem” in constitutional law). 
28. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 883 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985); Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common
Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2008). 
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these norms. And the more general critique of judicial lawmaking
is surely less compelling when such lawmaking conforms to roles
that our courts have exercised since the beginning of the Republic.
There is a certain circularity, of course, in saying that tradition
legitimizes the courts’ reliance on tradition. But prescriptive au-
thority necessarily embraces that sort of circularity.29
By surveying the uses of historical practice, I hope to make three
broader contributions to the literature in constitutional theory. As
Richard Fallon has noted, all participants in debates about constitu-
tional interpretation seem to agree that history is relevant to that
enterprise; it turns out, however, that history is used in multifari-
ous ways and not simply to establish the original understanding of
constitutional text.30 The first contribution, then, is simply to ex-
pand our understanding of how past practices figure into debates
about constitutional law.
The second contribution bears on the literature of constitutional
change. That literature is driven by a single compelling observa-
tion—that the structure of contemporary American governance and
the array of rights that individuals possess are hard to square with
the original understanding of the Constitution’s text, including the
textual amendments.31 The most prominent theories of constitu-
tional change outside Article V—such as Bruce Ackerman’s theory
of “constitutional moments”32—have dazzled more than they have
persuaded.33 If some form of “living constitutionalism” is a fact of
modern life, we need a much more specific (and plausible) account
of its mechanisms and some notion how those mechanisms are
29. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1808 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, History] (“[A]ny
practice-based theory of law contains an irreducible element of circularity: what is accepted
as law determines what the law is, either directly in cases of consensus or partly when
otherwise disputable questions must be resolved based on a mix of fit with past practice and
normative attractiveness.”). 
30. See id. at 1755-56.
31. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 455.
32. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
1043, 1059-60, 1093-95 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1286-1301 (1995)
(unpersuaded).
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disciplined and constrained. I submit that historical practice plays
a leading role in this story.
Finally, this Article draws on a philosophical tradition that is
often neglected in constitutional debates. Those debates are dom-
inated, on the Right, by a majoritarian and ultimately rationalistic
vision that employs originalism as a constraint on the counter-
majoritarian power of judges.34 The Left, on the other hand, em-
braces a vision of living constitutionalism as a means of either
furthering progressive moral values35 or carving out a wider sphere
for technocratic pragmatism.36 This Article builds instead on an
older tradition of classical conservative thought emphasizing a
Burkean commitment to prescriptive knowledge and organic, incre-
mental change. Part of my objective here is to elaborate what a
Burkean constitutional theory might look like.37
Part I of this Article lays some theoretical groundwork. I try to be
more specific about what we mean by reliance on historical practice,
discuss the distinct constitutive and entrenchment functions of
constitutions, and introduce Burke’s theory of prescription. Part II
assesses several specific areas in which federal courts law relies
upon historical practice: the doctrine of precedent; incorporation
into federal doctrine of preexisting bodies of law, such as the
English common law or equity practice; and the canons of statutory
construction. None of these areas invokes practice as a historical
“gloss” on the Constitution’s text in the manner of Noel Canning and
34. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
35. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410-11 (1986); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S.
KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION, at xv-xxi
(2010); Rebecca L. Brown, Assisted Living for the Constitution, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 985, 999
(2011); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
36. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CON-
STITUTION 5-6 (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 1-10 (1990).
37. A limited constitutional literature on Burke has developed in recent years, but it has
been written primarily by scholars who self-identify as progressives. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006). That literature is useful and
interesting, but for obvious reasons its embrace of Burke is partial and limited. For an
exploration grounded more thoroughly in Burke’s writings and speeches, see Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72
N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism].
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similar separation of powers cases, and each tends to derive the
legitimacy of practice from long duration rather than from notions
of interbranch acquiescence.
Part III draws some general conclusions. I argue that using
historical practice as a gloss on constitutional text to resolve con-
tested questions of separation of powers is neither the most common
nor the most important way in which such practice contributes to
our law. Entrenching such practice against legal change, I argue,
tends to be counterproductive. Moreover, reliance on practice is best
justified on prescriptive grounds. The primary alternative—practice
as acquiescence—is both descriptively implausible and normatively
unappealing. In the end, I hope to show that attendance to the uses
of practice in the somewhat more prosaic setting of federal jurisdic-
tion can both allay certain fears about reliance on practice and
contribute to important current debates about constitutional inter-
pretation.
I. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
The appropriate role of history has long been a staple of debates
about constitutional meaning. Attention has focused, however, on
the use of historical materials to ascertain the intent of the consti-
tutional Framers and the original understanding of terms appearing
in the constitutional text.38 Philip Bobbitt’s well-known modalities
of constitutional argument, for example, defined the “historical”
modality as focused on “the intentions of the framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution”; none of his six modalities afforded a place to
past practices that did not go to original intent.39 But as Richard
Fallon recently observed, “increasingly tired, stylized debates” about
originalism in constitutional interpretation obscure the wide variety
of ways in which history may influence the determination of
constitutional meaning.40 Post-founding practice, for example, may
provide insights into the original understanding of constitutional
38. Compare, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988) (defending focus
on the Framers’ intent), with Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) (just like it sounds).
39. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991). 
40. Fallon, History, supra note 29, at 1753.
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terms, resolve disputes about that meaning that existed at the
Founding, or suggest organic growth of constitutional meaning over
time.41
Historical practice has particular significance in federal courts
law. The constitutional text says little about the judicial power, and
both the convention and ratification debates focused largely on other
topics.42 As a result, the structure of the federal judicial system, its
modes of proceeding, and its relation both to the other national
branches of government and to the state governments have been
fleshed out through a wide variety of subconstitutional practices.
These include a succession of judiciary statutes enacted by Con-
gress, rules of procedure promulgated by the courts in the exercise
of delegated authority, a robust array of common law and equitable
doctrines, and a plethora of less formal norms and ways of proceed-
ing that have grown up over time. These enactments and practices
have legal force in their own right, but they also inform our
understanding of “the judicial power” in Article III.
Notwithstanding the pervasive impact of historical practice on the
law of federal jurisdiction, the phenomenon remains understudied
in this field. Much of the recent literature on historical practice as
a modality of constitutional interpretation focuses on separation of
powers.43 With certain important exceptions,44 historical writing
about federal jurisdiction has been in the originalist vein.45 This
may be more the case today than in the golden age of Legal Process
scholarship that once dominated and defined the field of federal
jurisdiction. That scholarship was often functionalist in its orienta-
tion, and when it turned to history it frequently looked to practice
41. On history’s relation to the organic growth of constitutional meaning, see Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 688-712.
42. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1, 47 (7th
ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
43. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
44. A recent panel of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Federal Courts
addressed “The Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon.” See Fallon, History, supra note
29; Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835
(2015); Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon: A Word
of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2015) [hereinafter Tyler, History].
45. See Tyler, History, supra note 44, at 1739 (“[I]n the federal courts arena—more so than
in the broader domain of constitutional law—originalism has always wielded tremendous
influence over much of the judicial and scholarly thinking.”). 
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across the broad sweep of our national experience, not simply to the
Founding era.46 Nonetheless, the broader current of contemporary
constitutional theory may have something to add to the way that
federal courts scholarship has thought about historical practice. And
the federal courts literature may have something useful to say to
the broader current of constitutional theory.
A. What Do We Mean by “Practice,” and How Do Courts Rely on
It?
It will help to begin by defining somewhat more precisely what we
mean by historical practice. “Practice” is, of course, a very broad
term; the Oxford English Dictionary defines it, for instance, as
simply “[a]n action” or “a deed” and contrasts it with “theory.”47 This
definition is broad enough to include virtually any binding legal
materials, such as a statute or a constitutional provision. To speak
of historical practice as a distinct source of legal meaning, however,
we need to distinguish it from past governmental actions that bind
courts and other decision makers of their own force. For purposes of
this discussion, I take a “practice” to be any past action of a public
or private actor that is invoked to resolve a present legal dispute
even though it has no direct binding effect on that dispute.
Common definitions of “practice” often incorporate the additional
element of repetition and regularity; the Oxford English Dictionary
speaks of “[t]he habitual doing or carrying on of something,” “usual,
customary, or constant action or performance,” or “[a] habitual ac-
tion or pattern of behaviour.”48 Hence, Justice Frankfurter empha-
sized the authority of a “systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued;”49 likewise, Noel Canning and Zivotofsky looked to
46. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 523-26, 530-33 (1954); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-47 (1954).
47. Practice, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (definition 2b); see also id. (“The
actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to the theory or principles
of it.”) (definition 2a). 
48. Id. (definitions 3a, 3b); see also id. (“Law. An established legal procedure, esp. that of
a court of law; the law and custom on which such procedure is based.”) (definition 3c).
49. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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past congressional and executive actions for a pattern of behavior,
not simply a single authoritative instance.50 I have little doubt that
the influence of a practice will be at least partly a function of the
degree and consistency of its repetition. At this definitional stage,
however, I do not want to rule out the possibility that a single act
might not have authoritative influence in certain situations.51
What practice counts, temporally speaking? As one “present at
the creation” of our government, at a time when American govern-
ment had no truly “longstanding” practice of its own, James
Madison understandably emphasized the force of precedents set by
early politicians and courts in elucidating constitutional meaning.52
But whether or not that very early practice has unique or even
exclusive force in other areas of constitutional law,53 the law of
federal courts has frequently relied on both historical practice that
long predates the Constitution (for example, the traditions of
English practice at common law and in equity and admiralty54) and
that developed considerably after ratification (for example, conven-
tions about the role of the United States Supreme Court vis-à-vis
state courts55). In these scenarios, the force of practice comes not so
50. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561-64 (2014); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135
S. Ct. 2076, 2091-94 (2015).
51. For example, George Washington’s decision not to run for a third term is a classic
example of a historical practice that shaped public understandings of the Presidency. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding Informal Constitutional Change 13-14 (Tulane Univ. Sch.
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 16-1, 2016), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2724580 [https://perma.cc/3BHK-C9P3] (discussing the significance of this
example). That decision derived considerable force from subsequent presidents’ repeated
efforts to conform their practice to Washington (at least until Franklin D. Roosevelt). See id.
But much of its force surely derived from the prestige and personal authority of Washington
himself. See, e.g., RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE
WASHINGTON 185-90 (1996) (discussing the power of Washington’s example).
52. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 241, 245 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987);
see also, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 55-58 (1993)
(discussing how very early interactions between President Washington and the Senate
demonstrated the unworkability of the Senate “advising” the President before he took action
on a matter, establishing a precedent emphasizing ex post “consent”). 
53. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 29-41 (canvassing and rejecting arguments for
exclusive reliance on early practice in the broader separation of powers context); see also
William Baude, Liquidation and Federal Judicial Power 4 (Oct. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the William & Mary Law Review) (arguing that Madison gave
primacy to later practice).
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (construing
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much from the status of politicians and judges closely associated
with the Founding itself but rather from the weight of longstanding
usage over time.
Courts have relied on practice and usage in a variety of ways.
Justice Frankfurter wrote in Youngstown that “[d]eeply embedded
traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the
Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of
a text or supply them.”56 This statement, occurring just before
Frankfurter’s oft-quoted mention of “gloss,”57 neatly articulates the
two ways in which historical practice generally enters into constitu-
tional analysis: practice helps us interpret the meaning of provisions
in the constitutional text; and practice also supplements that
canonical text, filling in its many gaps and thus becoming part of
our “constitution outside the Constitution.”
Much discussion of relying on historical practice in constitutional
law has focused on the first category. Acknowledging that the
Founding had failed to resolve all ambiguities in the constitutional
document, James Madison said in Federalist No. 37 that indetermi-
nacy is inevitable in “the institutions of man, in which the obscurity
arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is
contemplated.”58 Hence, “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the
greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,
until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of
particular discussions and adjudications.”59 And as Madison’s sub-
sequent conduct and statements made clear, he thought those
subsequent “discussions and adjudications” might well occur outside
amendments to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute not to disrupt the longstanding
relationship between the Court and the state courts).
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
57. See id. (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them.”).
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 52, at 244; see also id. at 245 (“When the Almighty
himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it
must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is
communicated.”).
59. Id.
2016] OUR PRESCRIPTIVE JUDICIAL POWER 551
the courts as well as within them.60 In this vein, the Noel Canning
majority turned to historical interactions between the President and
Congress to establish the meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause.61
On the other hand, much reliance on past practice in the law of
federal courts, which I discuss in Part II, seems supplemental in
nature. Article III does not specify the scope of the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction; in Murdock v. City of Memphis, however, the
Court imposed a strong presumption, derived from longstanding
practice, that the Court may not review state courts’ resolution of
questions of state law.62 Likewise, the Court has made clear that its
broad conception of state sovereign immunity is not a “gloss” on
either Article III or the Eleventh Amendment but rather an artifact
of preexisting practice under the English common law.63
Not surprisingly, however, the line between these two modes is
not completely clean even in theory, much less in practice. One
might describe phenomena such as the doctrine of precedent or
adoption of preexisting bodies of law as a gloss on the meaning of
the “judicial power” language in Article III without making any
mistake of principle. The key consideration, to my mind, lies in the
amount of work that the relevant textual provision does in the
analysis. In Noel Canning, for example, the text of the Recess
Appointments Clause sharply defined and limited the relevant set
of practices, and those practices in turn plainly reflected an effort by
60. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (Madison arguing to
his colleagues in the First Congress that their practice regarding presidential removal of
executive branch officers “will become the permanent exposition of the Constitution” on that
point); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasizing that “Madison referred both
to practice and to judicial decisions as involved in liquidation”).
61. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561-64, 2570-73 (2014).
62. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630-31 (1874). This rule is subject to an important exception
where state law issues are antecedent to a federal question, see, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan,
Supreme Court Review of State Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 487-88, but that
exception is also grounded in historical practice dating back at least to Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
63. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 69 (1996); see also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Manifestly, we
cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the
letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-
consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which
limit and control.”).
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the respective political actors to interpret the Clause.64 Hence, I
would treat Noel Canning as a clear case of historical gloss.65
At the other end of the spectrum, consider the federal courts
importing the longstanding equitable prohibition on enjoining a
criminal prosecution to ground the doctrine of Younger abstention.66
One might say that Younger is a gloss on the “judicial power” as it
relates to the powers of federal judges vis-à-vis state courts, but the
text of Article III does precious little work in the analysis of his-
torical practice. It seems much more helpful to say simply that
Article III leaves the relations of state and federal courts unspeci-
fied in a variety of important ways and that Younger abstention
supplements the canonical text by helping to constitute that rela-
tionship.
The Zivotofsky case poses an intermediate—and therefore more
difficult—case. The only constitutional text in sight is Article II,
which empowers the President to “receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers.”67 The Court read Founding-era practice as a gloss
on that language, concluding “that a Clause directing the President
alone to receive ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge
his power to recognize other nations.”68 The Court relied on further
evidence of practice—this time in international law—to conclude
that this recognition power “may also involve the determination of
a state’s territorial bounds.”69 Finally, the Court canvassed exten-
sive evidence of practices by Presidents and the Congress concern-
ing whether the recognition power is exclusive to the Executive.70
Whether or not the Court correctly evaluated all this evidence of
practice concerning recognition, it seems a considerable stretch to
64. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
65. Some commentators have seen an important difference between the use of practices
stretching over the course of our history to interpret ambiguous constitutional text (“gloss”)
and a focus on immediate postratification practice to fix the meaning of ambiguous terms
(“liquidation”). The important point for my purposes, however, is simply that both gloss and
liquidation employ practice as an interpretive tool for discerning the meaning of ambiguous
constitutional text.
66. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (relying on English equity practice
for rule barring federal court interference with pending state court criminal proceedings).
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
68. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015).
69. Id. at 2084 (citing an international law treatise).
70. See id. at 2091-94.
2016] OUR PRESCRIPTIVE JUDICIAL POWER 553
say that Article II’s text—which does not use the term “recognition”
and covers only receiving ambassadors—is doing much work. Better,
I think, to say that the Court is filling in the gaps in the President’s
power—that is, supplementing the canonical text—by looking to
past usage.71
A final critical issue involves the status of practice-based norms
vis-à-vis legal efforts to alter or override them. In Zivotofsky, the
Court held that Congress could not override the Executive’s decision
concerning territorial recognition;72 hence, the Court not only gave
legal force to the past practice of Executive recognition but also
entrenched that practice against change through ordinary lawmak-
ing. I explore the importance of this move in the next section.
B. The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions
This Article is about the use of historical practice in constitutional
cases, but I am employing a broader-than-usual view of what falls
in that category. Contemporary constitutional theory seeks to un-
pack the various functions of constitutions.73 As I have developed
elsewhere, constitutions typically do at least three things: they
constitute the government by creating institutions, defining those
institutions’ powers and conferring jurisdiction upon them, and
articulating rules for their operation; they frequently confer rights
on individuals vis-à-vis the government (which is really just the flip-
side of the constitutive function); and many (but certainly not all)
constitutions entrench the institutions and rights they create
against easy change in the future.74 Our Constitution, unlike
Britain’s, seeks to encapsulate each of these functions in a single,
canonical document. Writing in Federalist No. 37, however, James
Madison candidly acknowledged the complexity of defining the
71. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-
15 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying executive foreign affairs powers that are “missing” from the
constitutional text but that have been filled in by practice). 
72. 135 S. Ct. at 2096.
73. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227-30 (1993) (identifying “constitutional
essentials”); ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 3-6 (2003); Raz, supra note 17, at 153-54.
74. See Raz, supra note 17, at 153-54; Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at
415-16. The British Constitution, for example, is generally not entrenched because the Crown
in Parliament retains authority to make or unmake any law. See TOMKINS, supra note 73, at
16-17.
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powers and limits of governmental institutions as well as the dif-
ficulty of reducing the requisite concepts to writing.75
Hence, as John Marshall wrote in McCulloch, the Constitution’s
nature “requires[ ] that only its great outlines should be marked,
[and] its important objects designated.”76 This necessary incomplete-
ness means that the Constitution can have no monopoly of the first
of its functions; it cannot, in other words, constitute a complete
government on its own. Hence, Article I describes Congress in
greater detail than the other two branches, yet it leaves out critical
details such as structures for deliberation, voting rules, and
qualifications to vote in congressional elections.77 These details have
all been filled in through subconstitutional practices—some statu-
tory, some internal House and Senate rules, and some unwritten
conventions of behavior.78 Article III, which describes the judiciary
in far less detail, punted most of the crucial questions—such as
whether to create lower federal courts at all—to the First Congress
and continues to require considerable gap-filling.79
I have called the various forms of “ordinary law”—statutes, reg-
ulations, conventional practices—that perform these constitutive
functions our “constitution outside the Constitution.”80 But that
does not mean that these rules and institutions share the en-
trenched status of the Constitution’s canonical text.81 To be sure,
some of the historical practices that have fleshed out the meaning
of the Article III judicial power have hardened into rules that
Congress may not override. It seems safe to say, for example, that
Congress could not now enact a statute empowering the Supreme
75. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 52, at 243-45; see also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (“[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
the most gifted of its begetters.”).
76. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
77. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 418-20.
78. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing the nation’s “working Con-
stitution”). As Stephen Griffin has pointed out, Professor Llewellyn took practice to have more
than a gap-filling role; the practice is the Constitution, even when it may be inconsistent with
textual rules. See Griffin, supra note 51, at 12.
79. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 1-47; JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 24-31 (2012).
80. Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 454, 473.
81. See id. at 455.
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Court to issue advisory opinions.82 My point is simply that whether
a given practice should be viewed as constitutive of our governmen-
tal institutions is a separate question from whether that practice is
also entrenched against change through ordinary legal means.83 In
general, most governmental practices are constitutive to at least
some degree, but very few are constitutionally entrenched.
One of the principal sources of discomfort about the use of
historical practice in constitutional law stems from the fear that
past practices will either alter entrenched constitutional norms or
come to be entrenched against change in their own right. Writing
separately in Noel Canning, for example, Justice Scalia worried that
relying on historical practice allows the Executive to “accumulate
power through adverse possession,” in violation of entrenched
constitutional norms.84 But to say that American law sometimes
“constitutionalizes” historical practice is all too often to conflate the
different things that constitutions do. Many instances of reliance on
historical practice—especially in the law of federal jurisdiction—
treat that practice as constitutive without entrenching it against
legal change;85 other instances entrench past practice only partially,
without putting it on the same plane as the Constitution itself.86
Distinguishing between the different roles practice plays will help
in assessing the normative attractiveness of appeals to practice in
this area.
82. See Fallon, History, supra note 29, at 1817 (“At an early point in our history, The
Correspondence of the Justices and the acceptance of its rationale by the Supreme Court,
presidents, and the American public placed advisory opinions in the category of the consti-
tutionally forbidden.”).
83. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 454-55. Other theories of a
“functional” or “small c” constitution typically do assert that these additional rules and
institutions are entrenched to some degree. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 32, at 6-7;
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1-2, 7-8 (2010); Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 26-29. This creates a lot of
pressure to define what is in and what is out—a burden that, in my view, these other theories
have largely failed to carry. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 448-54.
84. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
85. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that the abstention doctrines, which are grounded in equity practice, are
subject to Congress’s legislative power).
86. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (holding Congress’s power to restrict
federal court jurisdiction subject to a strong clear statement rule but not constitutionally
prohibited altogether).
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C. Acquiescence and Prescription
Edmund Burke referred to reliance on longstanding practice in
government as “prescription”—a word we do not use so much
nowadays but which helpfully adds the notion of legal force to more
general terms like “custom” or “historical practice.”87 Prescription
embodies “a choice not of one day, or one set of people” but rather “a
deliberate election of ages and of generations; it is a Constitution
made by ... the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, disposi-
tions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people, which
disclose themselves only in a long space of time.”88 Against Enlight-
enment rationalists who set out to question “unthinking” adherence
to tradition, Burke insisted that prescription involved a higher form
of rationality. “[M]an is a most unwise and a most wise being,” he
argued.89 “The individual is foolish. The multitude for the moment
is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is
wise, and when time is given to it, as a species it almost always acts
right.”90
As J.G.A. Pocock has demonstrated, Burke’s theory of prescrip-
tion was rooted in the classic English doctrine of the ancient
constitution that undergirded the development of the English com-
mon law.91 William Blackstone’s Commentaries begin their discus-
sion of the common law with an account of longstanding custom.92
For Anthony Kronman, this sort of reasoning from prescriptive
authority makes law inherently different from philosophy:
[T]he past is, for lawyers and judges, a repository not just of
information but of value, with the power to confer legitimacy on
87. See Prescription, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007) (defining “prescription”
as “ancient or continued custom, esp. when regarded as authoritative” and a “[c]laim founded
upon long use”).
88. Burke, Parliamentary Reform, supra note 22, at 219.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 219-20.
91. See J.G.A. POCOCK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of
Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202,
227 (1971).
92. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67-68; see also id. at *64 (observing that the
unwritten laws of England “receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom”).
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actions in the present, and though its power to do so is not
limitless, neither is it nonexistent. In philosophy, by contrast,
the past has no legitimating power of this sort.93
In a profound meditation on Burke, Professor Kronman argues that
the past’s authority is distinct from any utilitarian or fairness-based
argument for precedent—that the past is, at bottom, essential to
what “makes us who we are” as human beings.94 These sorts of
arguments get short shrift in contemporary discourse.95 One sus-
pects that nonspecialists rarely study Burke nowadays.96
But in any event, one need not go this far to accept the force of
prescriptive reasoning. More practical rationales, resting on the
need to treat some things as settled in order to address present
problems in a manageable way, accord authority to past practice
simply because it is longstanding and settled.97 Likewise, concerns
about the disruptive effect of radical change tend to support an
incremental approach to constitutional development that takes
much of past practice as given at any particular stage.98
Burke’s notion that practice derives its authority from longstand-
ing usage—that the past has authority simply because it is the
past—runs counter to much contemporary discussion of historical
practice as an aid to constitutional interpretation. That literature
tends to ground the force of practice in the acquiescence of critical
93. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1032-33 (1990).
94. See id. at 1065-66. For a different argument that the past has authority simply
because it is the past, see Raz, supra note 17, at 173 (arguing that “[c]onstitutions, at least
old ones, do not derive their authority from the authority of their authors,” but rather “are
valid just because they are there, enshrined in the practices of their countries”).
95. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 3, at 703-04 (stating, with little elaboration, that past
practice cannot have authoritative force without some further normative reason behind it).
96. One hopes that the long-awaited completion of the definitive Clarendon Press edition
of Burke’s writings and speeches, see supra note 22, and several recent biographical studies,
see, e.g., RICHARD BOURKE, EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE
(2015); DAVID BROMWICH, THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE: FROM THE SUBLIME
AND BEAUTIFUL TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2014), may rekindle broader interest in Burke’s
thought.
97. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 6-9 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987).
98. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, On Being Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 407, 410-12 (new & expanded ed. 1991); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism,
supra note 37, at 654-56 (discussing Burke’s preference for incremental change).
558 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:535
actors.99 Likewise, Supreme Court opinions resolving high-profile
separation of powers disputes among the branches of the national
government tend to emphasize one branch’s acquiescence (or lack
thereof) to the exercise of power by a rival branch.100 To be sure,
one may understand any longstanding usage as resting on a form
of acquiescence; if the relevant political or legal actors had not
accepted the practice over time, they would have changed it.
Blackstone, for example, required that a custom “must have been
peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject to contention and dispute”;
this was because “customs owe their original to common consent.”101
But the sort of acquiescence entailed by prescriptive authority tends
to take place over a more extended period of time and to involve a
more diffuse set of actors than that involved in high-profile separa-
tion of powers disputes. Moreover, the authority of longstanding
practice tends not to depend on any sort of explicit airing of the
relevant issue, to which the affected party might have been expected
to object.
Interesting debates exist about the relationship between custom
and the common law, Blackstone’s particular theories of general and
local custom, and the extent to which those theories were found
persuasive in America.102 But the basic point is simply that long-
standing usage was integral to the English common law,103 and this
99. See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 54 (“Under most accounts of historical
gloss, there must be some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of gov-
ernment in order for the practice to be credited.”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 3, at 414
(“The most common reason [for invoking historical practice in the separation of powers
context] appears to be the idea that the cited practice involves the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch
in the actions of the other.”); see also Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 134 (1984) (arguing that for a historical
practice to have force in construing the separation of powers, “the other branch must have
been on notice” of the practice and “must have acquiesced” in it). 
100. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134
S. Ct. 2550, 2571-73 (2014); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684 (1981); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the force of presidential practice “long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned”).
101. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at *77. There are, however, important differences
between the sort of acquiescence involved in many separation of powers disputes and
“consent” as that term is generally understood. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 54 n.240
(“To the extent that historical gloss is premised only on the acquiescence of the affected
branch, it is not thought to require an actual agreement or bargain between the branches.”).
102. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 27-41 (2010).
103. See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-31
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notion of prescriptive authority would have been part of the Found-
ers’ basic intellectual equipment. Some influential figures in the
early Republic, such as Thomas Jefferson, labored mightily to re-
ject English traditionalism, and that way of thinking scored
important victories in preventing any blanket reception of the
common law into the federal Constitution and rejecting federal
prosecutions for federal common law crimes.104 Nonetheless, the
newly independent states’ universal reception of the English com-
mon law105 and the Framers’ direct incorporation of many common
law concepts into the Constitution itself106 suggest that the undeni-
able innovation of a written, higher-law Constitution was grafted
onto a broader legal system that derived significant authority from
ancient usage.107 As my colleague Stephen Sachs has observed,
“[n]ot even the American Revolution severed our links to the legal
past: the change in government wasn’t thought to produce a
wholesale change in law, especially private law.”108
Moreover, because the new written Constitution provided only a
framework of government and was designed to be accessible to the
People at large, it necessarily lacked the institutional detail nec-
essary to form a working government.109 Postratification practice
(defined broadly to include not simply informal actions but also
subconstitutional enactments and judicial decisions) has filled that
gap. Many features of the early practice—such as the rejection of
(1987).
104. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-42 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 224-25 (1911) (noting a
“prejudice against the system of English Common Law” in the years following the Revolution).
105. See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 791 (1951).
106. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (protecting the common law writ of habeas corpus); id.
amend. VII (protecting the common law right to a civil jury trial).
107. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 96-100 (1975) (discussing the
continuity of common law practice in the state courts before and after the Revolution);
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1234-35,
1238 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Federal Common Law II] (surveying the continuing importance
of the English common law in the early Republic after independence).
108. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1822 (2012).
109. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (observing that
a constitution’s “nature ... requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its im-
portant objects designated”).
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impeachment as a remedy for perceived judicial errors,110 the prohi-
bition on common law crimes,111 the bar on advisory opinions,112 the
crucial distinction between remedies against the sovereign and
remedies against the sovereign’s officers,113 and the requirement
that judicial judgments be immune from nonjudicial revision114—
have endured for centuries.
Prescription is a fundamentally predemocratic rationale for legal
norms. As I will show, however, it persists throughout American
legal practice. The most obvious example is American states’
reception of the English common law after the Revolution. While the
reception itself was generally accomplished by legislative adoption
and therefore a matter of democratic choice, the reception statutes
made no effort to review and distinguish among substantive
common law norms. Rather, reception was a democratic decision to
adopt the pre-Revolution law simply because it had been the law for
a very long time and its results were generally perceived to be
satisfactory.115 Just as the English legal system had transitioned
from monarchy to parliamentary democracy over time, while
retaining the common law and any number of other predemocratic
survivals, the newly independent American colonists grafted a new
110. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789-1815, at 422-25 (2009).
111. See, e.g., Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101
YALE L.J. 919, 922-23 (1992).
112. See Correspondence of the Justices, Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate
Justices to George Washington, President of the United States (August 8, 1793), in HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 52 (declining to render an advisory opinion on legal questions
submitted by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson on behalf of the Washington administration
involving the interpretation of treaties between the United States and France).
113. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824)
(articulating the “party of record” rule that a suit against the government’s officers will not
be treated as against the sovereign for purposes of sovereign immunity); see also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908) (holding that state sovereign immunity does not bar a suit
against a state officer for prospective relief); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219-20, 223
(1882) (permitting a suit against military officers acting on behalf of the United States to
proceed).
114. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792). It is worth noting that Hayburn’s
Case itself did not produce an opinion for the Court. See id. at 409-10. It is, rather, an instance
of practice consisting of the Court’s prejudgment proceedings in the case as well as
correspondence from the circuit courts regarding the matter. See also HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 42, at 83-85.
115. See Hall, supra note 105, at 800-02.
2016] OUR PRESCRIPTIVE JUDICIAL POWER 561
commitment to constitutionalism onto a preconstitutional English
system that, in most respects, was thought to be working reasonably
well. There was no Bastille to storm and no French Revolution-style
effort to rethink the legal system from the ground up.116
Both the nature of the prescriptive legal sources adopted in
American law and the dynamics of their integration with majoritar-
ian democracy and constitutionalism have important implications
for the ways prescriptive practice can function in constitutional
interpretation. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this
Article, prescriptive practice has always played an important and
pervasive constitutive role. Reliance on past practice absolved the
successful revolutionaries of any need to make the world anew; it
allowed them to rely on preexisting institutions and norms, holding
most of the legal system constant and allowing them to focus on
articulating the limited but important ways in which the new
government would differ from the old.117 But the notion of entrench-
ing past practice would have run counter to both the way those
practices had always worked and the new commitments to major-
itarianism and constitutionalism. The English common law had
generally not been entrenched, but—like the rest of English law,
including constitutional law—had remained subject to alteration by
a sovereign Parliament.118 And the Philadelphia convention rejected
proposals for a common law reception provision in the Constitution
itself precisely because that might have rendered the common law
immutable.119
I do not argue here that historical practices should never be
treated as shaping or supplementing constitutional meaning in a
way that cannot be modified through ordinary legislation. But we
should be terribly cautious about doing that. It is, after all, a mode
of constitutional interpretation with little support in historical
practice.
116. See Sachs, supra note 108, at 1821 (noting that after the American Revolution, “the
Founders didn’t declare a legal Year Zero, nor did they repeal and replace all prior law,” in
contrast to the French revolutionaries, who did generally abrogate all former laws and replace
them with the Code Napoleon). 
117. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 105, at 798-800; Sachs, supra note 108, at 1821-23.
118. See TOMKINS, supra note 73, at 16-17.
119. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 139, 160-64 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Jay, Federal Common Law II, supra note 107, at 1254.
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II. HISTORICAL PRACTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS LAW
This Part explores a variety of elements of federal courts law that,
in one way or another, involve reliance on historical practices. I
begin with three sets of familiar phenomena: judicial reliance on
past decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis; federal incorpora-
tion of preexisting bodies of law, such as the English common law;
and use of the canons of construction in interpreting federal
statutes. These phenomena are so familiar that we generally do not
think of them as part of the broader category of reliance on histori-
cal practice that figures in cases like Noel Canning or Zivotofsky.
Federal courts law does rely on practice in ways more analogous
to Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. The basic structure of federal
jurisdiction, such as the scope of the Supreme Court’s review in
cases arising under state law or in the state courts, have acquired
a strong sociological entrenchment arising from longstanding prac-
tice.120 The availability and parameters of habeas corpus review are
largely framed by practice.121 And the amenability of senior exec-
utive officials to federal judicial process has been established largely
by the President’s decision to comply at key points in our history.122
Nonetheless, a key part of my argument is that reliance on practice
120. See, e.g., Field, supra note 28, at 922 (“Erie [and] Murdock ... are a well-established
foundation of the system on which many of our suppositions concerning federalism have been
built. Even if not constitutionally required in any strict sense, they appear to be permanent
features of our system.”).
121. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739-52 (2008) (canvassing both English
and early American practice on judicial review of executive detention, although concluding
that the common law did not definitively answer the question before the Court); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-75, 481-82 (2004) (relying on English and American practice in
defining the territorial reach of the writ); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that habeas corpus is “a writ antecedent to statute ...
throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law”). Indeed, the Court has tended to
resist efforts to restrict its habeas jurisdiction by statute, even though its habeas juris-
prudence is not otherwise particularly friendly to petitioners. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 792 (invalidating restriction on habeas review of petitions by Guantanamo detainees under
the Suspension Clause); Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-36 (2000) (narrowly
construing new statutory restriction on availability of evidentiary hearings in federal habeas
proceedings).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); John P. MacKenzie, Court
Orders Nixon to Yield Tapes; President Promises to Comply Fully, WASH. POST (July 25, 1974),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-orders-nixon-to-yield-tapes-president-
promises-to-comply-fully/2012/06/04/gJQAZSw0IV_story.html [https://perma.cc/TK8V-VH95]. 
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is pervasive and routine and that reliance on past practice in these
more prosaic settings can shed important light on the broader
phenomenon.
A. Judicial Precedent
We generally think of judicial precedent and the doctrine of stare
decisis as their own modality of interpretation—not part of a
broader reliance on historical practice.123 But generally speaking,
the “practice” that courts engage in overwhelmingly involves the
decision of cases. There are, to be sure, certain aspects of internal
housekeeping, such as the assignment of panels and cases or the
Supreme Court’s certiorari policies,124 as well as certain rulemaking
functions of broader significance,125 when judges engage in “prac-
tices” outside the decision of cases.126 But the overwhelming
majority of judicial practice consists of deciding cases. The influence
that past decisions have in resolving present controversies is the
most familiar example of judicial reliance on past practice—so
familiar, in fact, that judges following precedent may be no more
aware that they are invoking historical practice than Molière’s
bourgeois gentleman was that he was speaking prose.127
Judicial precedent fits my definition of practice in two distinct
respects. First, a prior decision is itself a past act by another actor
that lacks direct binding authority on a current dispute. A judicial
123. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 39, at 13 (identifying the “doctrinal” modality of
“applying rules generated by precedent”).
124. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (articulating criteria for granting certiorari); H.W. PERRY, JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 33-34 (1991)
(explicating the considerably more complex patterns of practice underlying Rule 10); Adam
S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-7 (2015) (discussing panel assignment).
125. See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)) (delegating to the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
rules of procedure). 
126. Other examples would include the Chief Justice’s administrative powers over the
judicial branch, see, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief
Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 350 (2004), and the dramatic authority of the Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to control the litigation of mass torts and other sorts of aggregate
litigation, see, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71 (2015).
127. See MOLIERE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN act 2, sc. 4 (1670), reprinted in
MOLIERE—FOUR PLAYS (Carl Milo Pergolizzi trans., 1999).
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decision’s direct binding force is generally limited to the parties; this
force is captured by the doctrine of res judicata, not stare decisis.128
The influence of the past court’s decision is also conceptually dis-
tinct from the binding force of the underlying positive law—typi-
cally, a statute or constitutional provision—that the prior decision
applied. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent patent
law decision in Bilski v. Kappos.129 Section 101 of the Patent Act
broadly states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor.”130 Nonetheless, “[t]he Court’s precedents provide three
specific exceptions” for “‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.’”131 Acknowledging that “these exceptions are not
required by the statutory text,” the Court observed that “they are
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new
and useful.’”132 “And, in any case,” the Court said, “these exceptions
have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years.”133 Bilski is thus a particularly self-
conscious example of a course of decisions, taking place over an
extended period of time, that supplements the meaning of the
original textual provision that those decisions interpret and apply.
In constitutional law, the originalist critique of stare decisis has
long insisted that judicial precedents interpreting the Constitution
are not the same—and consequently lack the same authority—as
the authoritative document itself.134 For our purposes, the Supreme
Court’s decision interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause in
Noel Canning is not intrinsically different from the congressional
and executive interpretations of the clause that the Justices debated
in their opinions. Both involve interpretations of a constitutional
provision by one or another branch of government at some time in
128. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 492-93, 500-02 (2008) (distinguishing between the judgment
and precedential force of judicial rulings).
129. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
130. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
131. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
132. Id. at 601-02.
133. Id. at 602 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1852)). 
134. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 23, 25, 32 (1994). 
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the past. In the next dispute raising a recess appointments issue,
the Noel Canning opinion will be one more past practice interpret-
ing the clause that may bear on the present dispute.135 The relative
authority of past judicial interpretations vis-à-vis executive or
legislative interpretations turns on complex matters of separation
of powers, the res judicata effect of prior judgments on the original
parties, the remedies granted in the prior litigation, and the like.136
But if judicial precedents are typically more binding than legislative
or executive ones,137 it is not because adherence to judicial decisions
is any less a matter of deferring to historical practice.
Second, the rule of stare decisis—that is, the respect that judges
accord to prior decisions—is itself a judicial practice. The Constitu-
tion does not itself explicitly articulate a rule of precedent, and the
Supreme Court has said that stare decisis is simply “a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision.”138 The various nuances of the doctrine of precedent—the
factors involved in its application, for example, or the notion that
precedent binds more strongly in statutory cases than in constitu-
tional ones—are likewise simply rules of practice distilled from the
Court’s long experience deciding cases.139 When courts follow the
rule of stare decisis, they are adhering to the way they have done
things in the past.
Notwithstanding the Court’s statements that stare decisis is a
“principle of policy,” one often sees arguments that stare decisis is
inherent in the meaning of the “judicial power” conferred on the
135. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Is a Recess Appointment to the Court an Option?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:24 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/is-a-recess-
appointment-to-the-court-an-option/ [https://perma.cc/RX9M-3KCT] (parsing the Noel
Canning opinion to assess the possibility of a recess appointment following the death of
Justice Antonin Scalia).
136. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 407-08; Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POLITICS 401, 406-11 (1986).
137. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 843 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber & Sanford
Levinson eds., 2015) (discussing the reasons why judicial interpretations of the Constitution
tend to have a unique settlement function).
138. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 (1940)); cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1540-41
(2000) (arguing that stare decisis is subject to legislative abrogation).
139. Cf. Sachs, supra note 108, at 1865 (discussing stare decisis as a backdrop).
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federal courts by Article III.140 I have considerable sympathy for
that view, but I want to remain agnostic about it here. The impor-
tant point is that the Article III claim is itself a good example of
constitutional argument grounded in historical practice. Judge
Richard Arnold’s famous opinion in Anastasoff, for example, urged
that “in the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was
well-established in legal practice (despite the absence of a reporting
system), regarded as an immemorial custom, and valued for its role
in past struggles for liberty.”141 Judge Arnold’s view treats practice
as a gloss on Article III’s “judicial power;” the Supreme Court’s more
conventional invocation of stare decisis as a “rule of policy” accords
that practice its own independent force. But whether courts respect
stare decisis as a gloss on Article III or simply because it is a
longstanding way of proceeding, the authority of past cases rests on
past practice.
Like other forms of reliance on historical practice, the doctrine of
precedent takes into account the actions of actors outside the courts.
Precedential weight varies, for example, according to whether other
actors may correct the courts’ errors. Hence, the Court has said that
“[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitu-
tional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Con-
gress remains free to alter what we have done.”142 One could frame
140. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir.) (striking down rule
prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000);
Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional
End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 622 (2009); see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some
Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 702-03 (1998). But see Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159-69 (9th
Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (denying that stare decisis is baked into the “judicial power” language
in Article III).
141. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. Judge Kozinski’s effort to refute Judge Arnold’s argument
questioned the notion that past practice should be constitutionalized but primarily argued
that Arnold had misconstrued the practices of early courts and lawyers. See Hart, 266 F.3d
at 1163-69.
142. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (quoting Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)). Congress can, however, effectively
override certain constitutional decisions by granting statutory rights where the Court has
refused to extend constitutional ones. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714-17
(2005) (explaining that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 3,
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (2012), extends statutory rights against burdens on religious
exercise imposed by generally applicable laws that the Court had refused to extend under the
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this point as one of acquiescence: If Congress has not overridden a
court’s past construction of a statute, it may be read as agreeing
with (or at least accepting) that construction.143 But the Court gen-
erally stresses not acquiescence but whether or not other avenues
remain open to correct judicial mistakes.144 Further, the reliance
inquiry built into the stare decisis doctrine assesses whether other
actors—most often private individuals but also public actors such as
state governments—will be adversely affected by overruling a prior
decision.145
The precedential value of a prior decision often seems more
categorical than the sorts of nonjudicial practices at issue in Noel
Canning or Zivotofsky. But when courts call precedents into ques-
tion, the similarities between stare decisis and other practice-based
forms of argument come into focus. Consider, for example, the
debate in District of Columbia v. Heller concerning the force of the
Court’s prior decision in United States v. Miller, which had seemed
to embrace an interpretation of the Second Amendment grounded
in militia service.146 In urging the Court to follow Miller, Justice
Stevens’s dissent emphasized that “hundreds of judges have relied
on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there.”147 The majority
instead stressed defects in the Miller Court’s decisional process,
such as the defendant’s failure to appear and the Court’s own failure
First Amendment in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
143. See, e.g., Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (“Congress has had almost 30 years in which it could
have corrected our decision in Parden if it disagreed with it, and has not chosen to do so. We
should accord weight to this continued acceptance of our earlier holding.”). There are, of
course, any number of reasons not to infer too much from legislative inaction. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The ‘complicated
check on legislation’ erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible
to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1) approval
of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3)
unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political
cowardice.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))).
144. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stressing the particular need
for flexibility “in constitutional cases, because in such cases ‘correction through legislative
action is practically impossible’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
145. See, e.g., Hilton, 502 U.S. at 203.
146. See 554 U.S. 570, 623-26 (2008); 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
147. Heller, 554 U.S. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For similar emphasis on the con-
currence of many judges, see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1987).
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to discuss the history of the Second Amendment148—much as the
Justices in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky debated the extent to which
past legislative and executive practices reflected considered consti-
tutional judgments or had been consistent over time. Although in
principle a single decision may set a binding precedent, repetition,
longevity, and consensus plainly matter.149 Indeed, some justices
seem increasingly unwilling to accept a single decision, or even a
course of a few decisions, as binding until they have been repeatedly
reaffirmed over an extended period.150 It may well be that courts
generally view stare decisis as more obligatory than reliance on
other forms of historical practice, but these sorts of examples
demonstrate that there is no difference in kind.
The reasons that we follow past judicial interpretations are
basically similar to those for deferring to other forms of historical
practice. They involve the same notions of intellectual humility and
the need to avoid social disruption that Burke invoked in defense of
prescription:
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his
clock is however, sufficiently confident to think he can safely
take to pieces, and put together at his pleasure, a moral machine
148. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623-24.
149. See Strauss, Tradition, supra note 25, at 1706 (“It is one thing if a judicial precedent
has been followed on many occasions, has become widely accepted by society, and has created
a web of institutions dependent on it.... It is a different matter if a precedent is relatively
recent and has not met widespread acceptance—especially if the precedent itself overturned
a widespread practice.”); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 130 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (demonstrating at exhaustive length the error of the Court’s prior
holding in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) but declining to call for overruling the
century-old precedent).
150. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwill-
ing to accept Seminole Tribe [holding that Congress may not abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity] as controlling precedent.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to ...
Seminole Tribe.”); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 836-37 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (continuing to reject strict scrutiny for “benign”
racial classifications despite several prior holdings establishing that standard); Adam Liptak,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-no-fan-of-donald-
trump-critiques-latest-term.html [https://perma.cc/2KEE-8GGR] (reporting Justice Ginsburg’s
avowal of willingness to reconsider District of Columbia v. Heller). See generally Allison Orr
Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008).
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of another guise importance and complexity, composed of far
other wheels, and springs, and balances, and counteracting and
co-operating powers. Men little think how immorally they act in
rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their
delusive good intention is no sort of excuse for their presump-
tion. They who truly mean well must be fearful of acting ill.151
Burke’s mechanical metaphor suggests that any given precedent
may have become integrated into the legal mechanism such that the
effects of overruling it may be hard to anticipate. Moreover, there is
no a priori reason to think that judges today are smarter than the
judges of yesteryear. As Paul Brest has observed, “a doctrine that
survives over a period of time has the approval of a court composed,
in effect, of all the judges who have ever had occasion to consider
and apply it.”152
Finally, judicial precedent also performs a settlement function,
allowing the work of the law to proceed without reinventing the
wheel in every new case.153 As Charles Fried has put it, “[w]e want
to avoid being like the man who cannot get to work in the morning
because he must keep returning home to make quite sure that he
has turned off the gas.”154 But reliance on other forms of historical
practice—at least when they are not contested—also performs this
function. At least for purposes of the present discussion, it is hard
to see any reason to distinguish in principle between reliance on
settled judicial practices of interpretation (precedent) and reliance
on other forms of historical practice.
B. Incorporation of Extant Bodies of Law
A related form of reliance on primarily judicial practice occurs in
the many different areas in which the law of federal jurisdiction
151. Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (August 3, 1791), in 4 THE
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE, supra note 22, at 472; see also Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 648-50.
152. See Brest, supra note 38, at 228.
153. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)
(“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision
could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”).
154. FRIED, supra note 97, at 7.
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incorporates preexisting—and generally very old—bodies of noncon-
stitutional law. Sometimes this incorporation has been mandated by
statute. In the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, for example, Congress
required federal courts adjudicating suits at law to follow the forms
of proceeding in the states in which they sat;155 this generally meant
that they would follow the English common law, as received by the
relevant American state.156 In equity and admiralty cases, the 1792
Act directed federal courts to employ the forms of proceeding used
by English equity and admiralty courts.157 Likewise, the federal
piracy statute incorporates the definition of piracy in “the law of
nations.”158 Each of these preexisting bodies of law was binding
somewhere else but lacked direct force in American federal cases; in
that context, each was simply the longstanding practice of another
jurisdiction.
In other areas, the federal courts have taken it upon themselves
to adopt these preexisting bodies of law. Courts have grounded the
sovereign immunity of government institutions—both federal and
state—in the common law tradition inherited from England.159 The
155. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872); Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (repealed 1792).
156. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of
Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609, 667-68
(2015).
157. See id. at 614.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
159. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (grounding state sovereign
immunity in the common law rather than the text of the Eleventh Amendment); United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882) (observing that “the doctrine [of federal sovereign
immunity] is derived from the laws and practices of our English ancestors”); The Siren, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868) (grounding sovereign immunity in the “familiar doctrine of
the common law”). The Court has often been at pains to insist that state sovereign immunity
does not rest only on the common law. Sometimes the Court has pointed to still other bodies
of preexisting law. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (pointing out
that the Court’s decision expanding state immunities in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
“found its roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental
‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations’” (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 17)). And sometimes the
Court has relied on more abstract notions of state sovereignty. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 733-34.
But when the Court says that immunity from suit was “a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today,” it is grounding that immunity in the preexisting English common law
background. Id. at 713; see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity, for
States as well as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against
which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to
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individual immunities of government officers have similar roots.160
The various abstention doctrines rest in substantial part on the
discretionary practices of English common law and equity courts,161
and equity practice likewise provides remedies against unlawful
state action.162 Although the admiralty provisions of both Article III
and the various judiciary acts are purely jurisdictional in form and
do not specify the body of law to be applied, federal courts have read
those provisions to incorporate the general maritime law, or lex
mercatoria, which is a form of customary international law.163
sweep away.”); see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010) (“The doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity developed as a matter of common law long before the [Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act] was enacted in 1976.” (emphasis added)). In any event, whatever the precise
source of governmental immunity, all the candidates involve preexisting legal principles that
bind simply because they are longstanding historical practices. See, e.g., Hans, 134 U.S. at 15
(“The truth is that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by
the law, was not contemplated by the constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States.”).
160. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806 (1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-41 (1974); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483, 494-99 (1896); see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325 (holding that the individual
immunities of foreign officers are governed by the common law). As Scheuer points out,
however, official immunity “has been the product of constitutional provision as well as
legislative and judicial processes.” 416 U.S. at 240. But even the legislative immunities, which
derive in part from the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, have been importantly shaped
by past practice. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951) (grounding legislative
immunities in English parliamentary practice).
161. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717
(1996) (noting that “[o]ur longstanding application of these [abstention] doctrines reflects ‘the
common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted’” and
emphasizing the equitable roots of those doctrines (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989))).
162. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“The
ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of
courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing
back to England.”).
163. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (“‘With admiralty
jurisdiction’ ... ‘comes the application of substantive admiralty law.’” (quoting E. River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986))); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924); see also William Tetley, The General Maritime Law—The Lex
Maritima (with a Brief Reference to the Ius Commune in Arbitration Law and the Conflict of
Laws), 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 105, 108 (1994) (“The general maritime law is a ius
commune, is part of the lex mercatoria and is composed of the maritime customs, codes, con-
ventions and practices from earliest times to the present, which have had no international
boundaries and which exist in any particular jurisdiction unless limited or excluded by a
particular statute.”); Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 281-82
(1999) [hereinafter Young, Preemption at Sea].
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The history of the “general common law” provides a particularly
striking example of judicial incorporation of preexisting law. Cases
like Swift v. Tyson read the Rules of Decision Act164 to permit
federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the general commercial
law—another subclass of customary international law that was, as
Justice Story explained, “not the law of a single country only, but of
the commercial world.”165 Swift incorporated practice in a double
sense: The court adopted the practices of prior courts (including
state and foreign courts) in applying the general commercial law,
and that law itself derived its norms from the customs of merchants
engaged in commercial intercourse.166 When Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins overruled Swift, it hardly rejected this process of incor-
poration; rather, it required federal courts to defer more strictly to
the practices of the several states, which had themselves incorpo-
rated the lex mercatoria and the common law.167 And when courts
continue to make federal common law based on the presence of
uniquely federal interests, they have continued to draw on the
general commercial law.168
Federal courts law incorporates the English common law and
equitable practice, as well as the broader customs of maritime and
commercial law, as a pragmatic solution to the generality of the
Article III judicial power and its instantiation in the various ju-
diciary acts. The Framers of these mandates left innumerable
questions unanswered, and they could afford to do so because the
common law background either already answered them or provided
resources to do so in the future. As Peter Du Ponceau put it in the
early nineteenth century, “[w]e live in the midst of the common law,
164. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
165. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). See generally William A. Fletcher, The General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1984); Jay, Federal Common Law II, supra note 107, at 1263-64.
166. See, e.g., RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM
61-69 (1977) (describing the customary character of the general commercial law).
167. 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013) [hereinafter Young, Defense of
Erie].
168. See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (concluding that
“the federal law merchant ... stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal
rules applicable to these federal questions”). See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 509-12 (2006).
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we inhale it at every breath, imbibe it at every pore ... [and] cannot
learn another system of laws without learning at the same time
another language.”169 Rebels against British rule, the founding
generation nonetheless saw little need—and perhaps had little
ability—to remodel the entire legal system; instead, the preexisting
law shaped the new government at every turn.170 Federal courts law
maintains this basic conservatism today, preferring in nearly every
instance “off the shelf” solutions based on some preexisting source
of law to formulating new legal rules out of whole cloth.171
This sort of incorporation is by no means confined to federal
courts law, of course. Search and seizure law, for example, incorpo-
rates important elements of the common law of property. In
assessing the reasonableness of a search, the Court has noted “the
great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which
are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not
controlled by its rules.”172 The substantive due process cases have
frequently invoked common law principles in defining the “liberty”
169. PETER S. DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (Philadelphia, Abraham Small 1824).
170. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 107, at 67 (“There is no evidence that any of the men who
led Massachusetts into the War of Independence or any of those who followed acted for the
purpose of bringing about fundamental changes in the rules and institutions of which the
legal system was comprised.... The legal system that emerged from the war was, in short,
virtually identical to the old colonial legal system.”); Sachs, supra note 108, at 1821-23.
Professor Nelson goes on to document that “thereafter change was dramatic,” but these
changes had to do with adapting the common law to the needs of the growing Republic and
important shifts in the responsibilities of judge and jury; there was no wholesale rejection of
English law. NELSON, supra note 107, at 8-10, 67, 165-74.
171. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 747-52 (discussing the practice of
supplying limitations periods for federal causes of action that lack them by borrowing from
analogous state statutes of limitation). State law qualifies as a “practice” in this context,
because it is “borrowed” in situations in which it lacks direct legal force. Such state law
practices may or may not be of longstanding duration. Similar borrowing also takes place to
resolve ambiguities in federal statutory terms. See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)
(“It is ... well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’” (alteration and
omission in original) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739
(1989))). 
172. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 949-51 (2012) (acknowledging the reliance of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on
the common law of trespass); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978) (noting that
“reference to concepts of real or personal property law” can ground a reasonable expectation
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
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protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.173 More
broadly, the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence applying the Bill
of Rights to the States relies not on Justice Black’s theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment renders the first eight amendments directly
authoritative in state cases but rather on the more indirect notion
that the Bill of Rights provides a helpful guide to identifying the
principles of “fundamental fairness” that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects.174 As the younger Justice Harlan put it, “the Bill of
Rights is evidence ... of the content Americans find in the term
‘liberty’ and of American standards of fundamental fairness.”175
My friend and colleague Stephen Sachs has described our English
inheritance of the common law and equity principles as a “con-
stitutional backdrop.”176 He rightly observes that “[o]ur founding
document is firmly rooted in the common law tradition, in which
each new enactment is layered on top of an existing and enormously
complex body of written and unwritten law.”177 Professor Sachs’s
discussion is tremendously helpful in illuminating the extent to
which our legal system in general—and constitutional law in parti-
cular—builds on a body of preexisting legal principles and practices.
But exploring the divergences between Sachs’s account and my own
will help illuminate the approach advanced here.
A “backdrop,” as Professor Sachs uses the term, is not “historical
practice” as I have defined it. A historical practice, for my purposes,
is a prior action or rule that does not bind directly within the
context of the dispute in which it is invoked. The Constitution itself
is not “practice,” because it binds us today as law; neither are the
portions of the 1789 Judiciary Act that remain in effect today. But
many early Presidents’ tendency to issue Thanksgiving Day procla-
mations is a practice that might be relevant to contemporary
disputes about the meaning of the Establishment Clause, because
173. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) (relying on the
common law doctrine of informed consent to identify a “liberty interest” in refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (stating
that “the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship between persons
[here] has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society,”
and looking to the common law to define those practices).
174. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759-66 (2010).
175. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
176. Sachs, supra note 108, at 1816.
177. Id. at 1822.
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they may reflect a longstanding view about the permissibility of
official invocations of the Deity.178 At the same time, of course, those
proclamations themselves have no binding force in contemporary
Establishment Clause litigation.
For Professor Sachs, legal backdrops are relevant precisely be-
cause they continue to have binding legal force today. Because “the
Constitution left most preexisting law alone,” he says, “[a]ny legal
rule that wasn’t abrogated by the Constitution’s enactment simply
kept on trucking after 1788.”179 Hence, the English common law,
equity practice, and other bodies of preexisting law “remained in
force subject to the Constitution’s requirements, to the privileged
status of federal law under the Supremacy Clause, and to the
ordinary processes of abrogation, amendment, and repeal.”180 For
Sachs, the common law is relevant because it simply remains the
law—not because it is a practice that may influence the interpreta-
tion of existing law or, in some way, supplement the traditionally
binding legal materials. Moreover, what makes the common law a
constitutional backdrop is that it is “preserved from change” in
various ways.181
Certainly some aspects of the common law, equity practice, or
other forms of preexisting law have continuing force in our legal
system.182 But the transition from English to American law was not
seamless,183 and it differed at the national and state levels. The
states did not simply allow the English common law to continue in
force. Rather, they expressly “received” it into state law through
178. Compare, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 622-25 (1992) (debating the significance
of Thanksgiving proclamations for the Establishment Clause), with id. at 633-35 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (same).
179. Sachs, supra note 108, at 1823.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. For example, Professor Sachs cites longstanding customary international law rules
governing interstate borders, which not only have continuing legal force but are effectively
insulated from change by constitutional prohibitions on reassigning territory from one state
to another. See id. at 1828-34.
183. See PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES
58 (De Capo Press 1970) (1899) (“The process which we may call the reception of the English
common law by the colonies was not so simple as the legal theory would lead us to assume.
While their general legal conceptions were conditioned by, and their terminology derived
from, the common law, the early colonists were far from applying it as a technical system,
they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and they consciously departed from many
of its most essential principles.”). See generally Hall, supra note 105, at 805-07. 
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specific reception statutes or provisions in state constitutions,184 and
they took only those portions they found applicable to their local
conditions.185 And the Framers of the national Constitution ex-
plicitly debated—but rejected—a parallel reception of the English
common law into national law.186 Writing to St. George Tucker, John
Marshall stated that “I do not believe one man can be found” who
maintains “that the common law of England has ... been adopted as
the common law of America by the Constitution of the United
States.”187 Nor is there any federal statute receiving the common
law en masse into national law; hence, the Supreme Court in
Wheaton v. Peters found it “clear[ ] there can be no common law of
the United States.... The common law could be made a part of our
federal system, only by legislative adoption. When, therefore, a
common law right is asserted, we must look to the state in which
the controversy originated.”188
184. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (2016) (“All such parts of the common law as were here-
tofore in force and use within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive
of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this State and the
form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided for in
whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full
force within this State.”). See generally Hall, supra note 105. One state received the common
law through judicial decision. See Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, 181 (1851) (“We have, in
our judicial practice, adopted so much of the common law as was operative as law, in the
father-land, when our ancestors left it, and which was adapted to the new state of things here,
under our colonial condition. This was our inheritance.”).
185. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.) (“The common
law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought
with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with
them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.”); ROSCOE POUND,
THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 20 (1938) (“Legislatures and courts and doctrinal
writers had to test the common law at every point with respect to its applicability to
America.”).
186. See Jay, Federal Common Law II, supra note 107, at 1254-62; see also Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137-42 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing this history).
187. Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), reprinted in Jay,
Federal Common Law II, supra note 107, app. A, at 1326; see also JAMES MADISON, Report on
the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 341 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [herein-
after MADISON, Report on the Resolutions] (rejecting any general reception of the common law
into federal law). Justice Story seems to have believed that the Constitution and relevant
federal statutes did permit federal courts to rely on the common law in certain criminal cases.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 640-41 (discussing Story’s position in United States
v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816)). But this is a long way from a general reception.
188. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). Professor Sachs writes that “the decision in Wheaton
didn’t actually get rid of the ‘common law of the United States,’” citing admiralty law as a
counter-example. Sachs, supra note 108, at 1883. But maritime law was not treated as federal
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English rules of common law and equity, as well as the broader
corpus of maritime law, thus do not become part of federal law
because they simply remained in force notwithstanding “the late un-
pleasantness”—to borrow a Civil War euphemism—between Britain
and its American colonies. Rather, they come in because particular
provisions of federal law, such as the Process Acts or the Admiralty
Clause in Article III, adopted them, or because federal judges, using
their more limited authority to adopt federal common law rules to
govern the cases before them, imported them as helpful “off-the-
shelf” solutions to problems arising in federal litigation.189 As such,
these older bodies of law were practices, whose legal force depended
on a current decision to accept them as binding. In most situations,
this conceptual hair-splitting will make little difference. But it does
matter when aspects of the English “backdrop” are argued to be
entrenched against change by ordinary legal means190—a problem
I return to in Part III.
Incorporation of preexisting bodies of law may have a dynamic as
well as a conservative impact on the law. Just as state courts used
the common lawmaking powers that they received along with the
substantive English common law to adapt that law to the context of
the growing American states,191 so too federal court law has adapted
as it adopted preexisting bodies of law. The federal Constitution
law until the Supreme Court’s much-criticized decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917). See Fletcher, supra note 165, at 1549; Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note
163, at 319-25. Prior to that, it was considered to be “general” law, neither state nor federal
in nature. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 690. Moreover, maritime law has not
generally been understood as synonymous with “common law.” See Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362-65 (1959) (holding that “admiralty” is a distinct class of
jurisdiction from “suits ... at common law or in equity ... arising under the ... laws of the
United States” (quoting Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470)); Bradford R.
Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1280-83
(1996) (demonstrating maritime law’s roots in customary international law); Tetley, supra
note 163, at 109-14 (documenting the origins of maritime law in the law of nations). Likewise,
it is relatively well settled that the general commercial law applied under Swift v. Tyson was
not considered federal. See Fletcher, supra note 165, at 1574-75. Its force depended on state
choice of law rules mandating its application in commercial cases. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN,
supra note 166, at 72-73.
189. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 108, at 1816, 1878 (arguing that backdrops are insulated
against most kinds of legal change); id. at 1873-75 (suggesting that the English common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity is immune from congressional abrogation).
191. See NELSON, supra note 107, at 8-10.
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explicitly incorporated the English common law writ of habeas
corpus as a restraint on executive detention,192 but the Reconstruc-
tion Congress extended the writ to persons in state custody,193 and
the Supreme Court ultimately interpreted it as a basis for collateral
attack on state convictions194—a remedy directed to the unique
problems of American federalism. English admiralty law extended
only to tidal waters, but American law stretched it to cover all navi-
gable waterways by 1851, which had the intended effect of extend-
ing federal maritime jurisdiction to cover a broad swath of interstate
commerce.195 And the Supreme Court has both received and adapted
the English common law of sovereign immunity— building upon
such English remedies as the petition of right but then extending
them to wholly new contexts, such as damages actions against law
enforcement officers—to construct a relatively flexible array of rem-
edies against government officials for constitutional violations.196
Federal courts law’s incorporation of preexisting bodies of law
thus illustrates the flip side of prescriptive authority, that is, its
pairing of respect for the past with enablement of incremental
change and reform. The most eloquent account of “living constitu-
tionalism” in American law, the younger Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, is squarely grounded in the common law method.197
192. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73,
81-82 (1789) (conferring authority on the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for
prisoners in federal custody). 
193. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
194. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 1194
(“[P]ostconviction relief was not the original office of habeas corpus, which focused instead on
whether extra-judicial detention—most often by the executive—was authorized by law.”).
195. See generally Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause
in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1215-26 (1954).
196. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (invoking “the distinctive historical traditions of
equity as an institution” to affirm the federal courts’ power to recognize other remedies, in-
cluding damages relief, against federal officers for constitutional violations); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908) (extending officer suits to state officers and claims for prospective
relief that do not rest on invasion of a common law interest); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 236-39, 241 (1882) (recognizing that the national government inherited the English
crown’s immunity at common law, but holding by analogy to the petition of right that this
immunity did not bar suits against officers for prospective relief).
197. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds). Justice Harlan wrote: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
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By incorporating preexisting bodies of law that themselves presup-
pose a strong role for judicial elaboration over time, this form of
reliance on past practice also injects a degree of fluidity into federal
courts doctrine.
C. Canons of Statutory Construction
The canons of statutory construction defer to historical practice
in at least three senses. The first is that most of these rules
themselves represent venerable traditions of interpretation. Abbe
Gluck’s recent work has investigated the fascinating and difficult
question of whether methodologies of statutory construction are
themselves law—so that, for instance, federal courts interpreting
state statutes would be required to apply state canons of construc-
tion.198 But whether or not that is true, there is no doubt that the
canons also represent longstanding regularities of practice within
the judiciary.199 Federal courts apply the canons because previous
courts have applied those canons. And the stability of the canons is
thought to provide a baseline against which Congress can legis-
late.200
the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to
roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute,
in this area, for judgment and restraint.
Id. at 542; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992) (plur-
ality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (adopting Justice Harlan’s reasoning);
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 695 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s
dissent in Poe demonstrates the application of the common-law model [of constitutionalism]
to resolve actual cases”).
198. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907 (2011).
199. See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 344-45 (2010) (discussing the canons as a form of customary law).
200. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 531 n.22 (1983) (“Congress ... appear[s] to have been generally aware that the
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The second and third ways in which the canons defer to historical
practice turn on the nature of the canon in question. The statutory
interpretation literature generally divides rules of interpretation
into two classes: descriptive canons, which embody judgments about
how the enacting legislature most likely would have preferred to
resolve ambiguities that arise within a statute; and normative
canons, which implement other values that the legislature may or
may not share.201 Descriptive canons generally seek to assess leg-
islative preferences by reference to regularities in past legislative
practice—the judgment, for example, that when the legislature
passes a new statute, it generally does not mean to disrupt other
aspects of the law unless it specifically says that it does.202 These
canons thus embody deference to past legislative practice.
Normative canons, on the other hand, are problematic precisely
because they so often fly in the face of likely legislative pref-
erence.203 The rule of lenity, for example, holds that “when there are
two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the
other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken
in clear and definite language.”204 This approach cannot, to put it
mildly, plausibly rest on a judgment that legislators generally look
out for and mean to protect the interests of criminal defendants;
rather, it is traditionally justified as protecting due process values
statute would be construed by common-law courts in accordance with traditional canons.”);
see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (making this point about the Chevron rule construing statutory ambiguity
as legislative intent to delegate interpretive authority to agencies). Scholars have questioned
whether legislators are actually aware of judicial canons of statutory construction—and thus
whether those canons can function as a baseline in this way. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse &
Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575, 597-600 (2002). But the most recent empirical work on that subject suggests a
higher degree of legislative awareness of the canons than the earlier academic conventional
wisdom supposed. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 929 (2013).
201. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992); Ernest A. Young, Constitu-
tional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1549, 1586-87 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Constitutional Avoidance].
202. See Ross, supra note 201, at 563.
203. See id.; see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78
GEO. L.J. 353, 389-91 (1989) (suggesting that these sorts of canons raise legitimacy problems
as a form of judicial lawmaking).
204. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
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of fair notice.205 As the rule of lenity suggests, sometimes normative
canons trace directly to constitutional principles. Often, however,
the values protected are more diffuse. The rule disfavoring repeals
of preexisting law by implication from a new statute,206 for example,
is hard to ground in any specific constitutional principle.
David Shapiro has demonstrated, however, that canons like the
one against implied repeals serve a broader function of maintain-
ing continuity and coherence in the law. For Professor Shapiro, the
most important interpretive canons “are those that aid in reading
statutes against the entire background of existing customs, prac-
tices, rights, and obligations—in other words, those that emphasize
the importance of not changing existing understandings any more
than is needed to implement the statutory objective.”207 This view of
the canons takes in those rules of construction, like the rule of lenity
or the presumption against preemption,208 that point to specific con-
stitutional principles, because those canons harmonize new laws
with those principles without forcing an evaluation of actual con-
stitutional conflict.209 But as the rule against implied repeals
suggests, Shapiro’s notion of coherence also includes integration
with the vast mass of preexisting subconstitutional law.210 The
canons respect the fact that subconstitutional law often plays a
critical role in constituting our institutions, so that a repeal of a
preexisting statute, regulation, or common law doctrine may be just
as disruptive as a statute that undermines some constitutional
value.211
205. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 332 (2000).
206. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) (“[W]here two
statutes are ‘capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’” (quoting Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974))).
207. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 925.
208. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
209. See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
An Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2010) [hereinafter Young, Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation].
210. See, e.g., Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
of Va., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) (“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that
‘[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute
be clear and explicit for this purpose.’” (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1813))).
211. See Sachs, supra note 108, at 1838-43 (discussing the notion of “defeasibility” in
integrating new law with preexisting arrangements).
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Professor Shapiro’s notion of statutory construction as an instru-
ment of continuity with past practice is nowhere more apparent
than with respect to statutes construing the authority of the federal
courts. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, the Supreme Court con-
strued an amendment to the statutory section prescribing the
Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from the state courts to permit only
review of federal questions, not any state law issues that might also
be necessary to resolve the entire dispute.212 It did so notwith-
standing a recent amendment that arguably broadened the Court’s
jurisdiction, noting that if it were Congress’s intent to “revers[e] the
policy of the government from its foundation in one of the most
important subjects on which [Congress] could act, it is reasonably
to be expected that Congress would use plain, unmistakable lan-
guage in giving expression to such intention.”213
A different result in Murdock would have disrupted the estab-
lished relationship between state and federal law. As Martha Field
has explained, if the United States Supreme Court could substitute
its own view of state law for that of the highest state court, “it would
not be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It is thus
because of Murdock that the whole concept of state law as distinct
from federal law is a meaningful one.”214 While Murdock purported
only to construe the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute, it is a
profoundly constitutive decision; it is, as Professor Field observes,
“such a fundamental part of our way of thinking about the boundary
between state and federal power that many of our suppositions,
constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.”215 The Court’s
construction of the statutory amendment was thus predicated on the
need to ensure continuity with this broader web of past (and
ongoing) practices.
Likewise, the Court’s jurisdiction-stripping precedents—which
consistently construe jurisdictional statutes in such a way as to
minimize encroachments on the longstanding scope of federal
jurisdiction—demonstrate the strength of the continuity impulse
even in the teeth of aggressive new statutory language.216 In INS v.
212. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 632-33 (1874).
213. Id. at 619.
214. Field, supra note 28, at 921.
215. Id. at 920.
216. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105-06 (1868) (construing 1868 statute
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St. Cyr, for example, the Court confronted a statutory text that
seemed unequivocally to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to
review deportation orders.217 The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provided that
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law ... no court shall have
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien
who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumer-
ated criminal offenses.218 Nonetheless, the Court found that this
provision was not sufficiently clear to proscribe review by writ of
habeas corpus: “[T]o conclude that the writ is no longer available in
this context would represent a departure from historical practice in
immigration law,” the Court said, noting that “[t]he writ of habeas
corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive
detention.”219 Moreover, the Court’s prior precedents had demanded
explicit textual references to habeas corpus in order to foreclose that
remedy—a reference that, for all its aggressive language, the
IIRIRA provision failed to include.220
Amanda Tyler has explained that St. Cyr and similar cases rely
on “a combination of the canon against implied repeals and a clear
statement rule protecting structural harmony, as well as a heavy
dose of stare decisis—namely, continuing and strong reliance on the
model set forth in Yerger.”221 One might also think of the Court’s
requirement of a super-strong clear statement in order to cut off
federal jurisdiction as embodying a constitutional norm against
jurisdiction stripping, albeit one defeasible by Congress if it acts
with sufficient clarity.222 These two views are not necessarily in
tension. Hard constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping are hard
depriving the United States Supreme Court of habeas jurisdiction not to affect the original
writ of habeas in the 1789 Judiciary Act); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996)
(construing restrictions on habeas in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
to nonetheless permit some habeas review under Yerger). See generally HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 42, at 316-18, 336-38; Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1438-60 (2005) [hereinafter Tyler, Canons]; Young, Constitutional
Avoidance, supra note 201, at 1553-73.
217. 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
218. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2012).
219. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305.
220. See id. at 311-13.
221. Tyler, Canons, supra note 216, at 1459.
222. See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 201, at 1602-13.
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to identify,223 and the strongest arguments against such measures
will generally be that they fly in the face of centuries of institutional
practice concerning the relationship between Congress, the federal
courts, and the courts of the states.224 The canons of construction, in
Professor Shapiro’s model, exist primarily as a means for ensuring
that new legislation does not unduly disrupt such practices.225 What
cases like St. Cyr illustrate most vividly is that the canons may be
employed to enforce such continuity even in the teeth of what
Congress almost surely intends.226
Of course, not everyone accepts Professor Shapiro’s view of statu-
tory construction as a means primarily of maintaining continuity
with the past. As Professor Tyler points out,
[P]roponents of an engineering vision of courts in the realm of
statutory interpretation generally contend for an interpretive
approach by which courts “update” the legislature’s work and
absolve that body of the need to police judicial constructions that
may no longer remain in keeping with prevailing political or
social norms.227
William Eskridge thus argues that statutes “should—like the Con-
stitution and the common law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is,
in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”228
But as Professor Eskridge’s invocation of the common law
suggests, even “dynamic” takes on statutory interpretation are not
fundamentally inconsistent with an emphasis on continuity with
past practice. In Burke’s thought, organic growth is the flipside of
prescriptive authority. For Burke, “the idea of inheritance furnishes
223. See id. at 1553-73; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 42, at 295-345 (surveying
the terrain); Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030-38 (1982) (finding few, if any, limits).
224. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 223, at 1038-39 (concluding that certain restrictions on the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction would “violate the spirit of the Constitution [by dis-
rupting longstanding assumptions about the Court’s role] even if it would not violate its
letter”).
225. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Young, Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 209, at 1387-
91 (arguing that the canons of statutory construction help ensure that statutes cohere with
constitutional values).
227. Tyler, Canons, supra note 216, at 1390.
228. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1479 (1987).
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a sure principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmis-
sion; without at all excluding a principle of improvement.”229 In
Swift v. Tyson, for example, Justice Story construed the Rules of
Decision Act to be consistent with preexisting practice—in both
America and elsewhere—extracting a general body of commercial
law principles from the customs of merchants.230 Maintaining con-
tinuity with that longstanding practice also solidified the dynamic
role of the federal courts in developing a nationally uniform body of
commercial principles.231
But Burke insisted on an incremental method of change in which
“[b]y a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is
watched,” and that any reforms “proceed[ ] upon the principle of
reference to antiquity ... [and] be carefully formed upon analogical
precedent, authority, and example.”232 As later students of Burke
have pointed out, this is the method of the common law tradition,
whereby “custom was constantly being subjected to the test of
experience, so that if immemorial it was, equally, always up to
date.”233 Justice Story’s general commercial law, for example, was
tied to and disciplined by existing practice and the need to coordi-
nate with other courts applying the same body of law.234 Much as
the common law tradition has frequently facilitated organic growth
in American constitutionalism,235 so too the canons of interpretation
229. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790), reprinted in 8
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 53, 84 (Paul Langford ed., Clarendon Press
1989) [hereinafter BURKE, REFLECTIONS].
230. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 166, at 61-97;
Young, Defense of Erie, supra note 167, at 30-38.
231. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
245-52 (1977).
232. BURKE, REFLECTIONS, supra note 229, at 81, 217.
233. See POCOCK, supra note 91, at 213; see also Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra
note 37, at 655-56.
234. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 165, at 1562. Ultimately, the general common law ap-
plied under Swift overflowed the constraints that had made it workable in the first half of the
nineteenth century, creating the crisis that led to Erie. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Erie-
Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785,
1792 (1997); Young, Defense of Erie, supra note 167, at 37-38. The broader, late version of the
general common law tended to restrict the ability of states to change their laws to suit new
financial and regulatory imperatives. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity
Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1265
(2000). Hence, one effect of Erie’s decision to overrule Swift was to enhance the dynamism of
the legal system by restricting federal courts’ authority to disregard state innovations. 
235. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (relying in part on
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have facilitated institutional change by cushioning the shocks that
might otherwise deter or short-circuit reform.236
III. THE CONSTITUTIVE AND ENTRENCHMENT EFFECTS OF PRACTICE
The doctrines just discussed hardly exhaust the many ways in
which federal courts law incorporates and defers to historical prac-
tice. Indeed, I have left out many of the more prominent examples
in order to shine some light on instances in which the dynamic may
be less obvious. But the examples I have highlighted are enough, I
think, to support a few more general points about deference to
historical practice in this area. Crucially, federal courts law uses
historical practice in ways that diverge from its use in high-profile
separation of powers disputes like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. It
is, I suggest, a mistake to focus only on these “big cases.”
Two points of divergence are critical. First, federal courts law
uses practice primarily to supplement and fill gaps in other sources
of binding law—not to “gloss” the meaning of particular constitu-
tional provisions. Largely because of this, federal courts law rarely
entrenches past practice against change by ordinary legal means.
Second, federal courts law generally does not rely on some theory of
acquiescence by the other branches to justify reliance on past
practice. In many settings, such acquiescence seems largely beside
the point. Instead, the examples I have canvassed tend to rely on
practice based on its longstanding pedigree. Federal courts law thus
embraces—albeit often implicitly—a prescriptive rationale for past
practice. I argue below that this rationale is normatively superior
to an acquiescence model of historical practice.
A. The Nonentrenchment of Practice in Federal Courts Law
The vast majority of historical practices I have surveyed help
constitute our judicial institutions—and in this sense properly fall
common law protections of the home and marital privacy to recognize a new right of privacy
under the Due Process Clause).
236. See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
811 (1994) (demonstrating that the development of a presumption against preemption mit-
igated the disruptive effect of the Court’s expansion of Congress’s commerce power during the
New Deal).
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under the rubric of “constitutional” interpretation—without en-
trenching those practices against change by ordinary political
processes. The constitutive and entrenchment functions of constitu-
tional law do not necessarily run together, and in federal courts law
one frequently sees the former without the latter. This is true of
each set of practices surveyed in the preceding Part.
The common law, for example, has generally been defeasible by
statute; indeed, it was generally received into American law under
the express condition that this would be so.237 Both state and federal
legislatures have interstitially supplanted that body of law as they
deemed necessary.238 Specific imports—such as the common law
immunities of individual government officers or the equitable prin-
ciples built into the abstention doctrines—can be modified or
repealed by legislation.239 Likewise, both the general maritime law
and the general commercial law have often been altered or super-
seded by federal and state legislation.240
The canons of construction are likewise largely unentrenched.
This is obviously true with respect to the canons’ impact on
construction of particular statutes; when canons grounded in
237. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 105, at 798-800 (noting that early state statutes receiving
the common law stipulated that it could be modified by subsequent legislation); see also 
MADISON, Report on the Resolutions, supra note 187, at 379-80 (explaining that the reason
that the Philadelphia convention rejected receiving the common law into the Constitution was
to avoid entrenching common law principles against legislative change).
238. See, e.g., Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429 (1997) (noting
that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act “expressly abolishes or modifies a host of common-
law doctrines that previously had limited recovery” in railroad accident cases); Easterling
Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 64 So. 461, 461-62, 465 (Miss. 1914) (upholding against constitutional
challenge a state statute abrogating the fellow servant rule in tort).
239. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015) (not-
ing that “[t]he power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is subject
to express and implied statutory limitations,” and holding that the Medicaid Act foreclosed
equitable relief); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (observing that abstention rules are subject to Congress’s legislative power); Mitchell
N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV.
1037, 1127 (2001) (discussing Congress’s power to override the doctrine of qualified immunity
for government officers).
240. See, e.g., Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1995) (observing that, in
enacting the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, Congress overrode the general maritime rule
precluding a seaman’s recovery for negligence by his vessel’s master or crew); AFC Interiors
v. DiCello, 544 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ohio 1989) (holding that Ohio’s adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code had superseded the common law commercial doctrine of accord and
satisfaction).
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established practice influence the construction of a statute, Con-
gress may override the courts’ work.241 The same thing is generally
true of the canons themselves. Certainly the courts themselves
change the canons over time, employing them more insistently in
some eras than others, creating new canons from time to time, and
allowing others to fall into disuse. To the considerable extent that
descriptive canons of construction reflect patterns of legislative
practice, they necessarily change as that practice changes over
time.242 Congress is able to control the process of interpretation by
legislating general rules of construction (although these are often
ignored)243 and by enacting interpretive principles in particular
statutes.244
The harder question is whether Congress may override particular
normative canons—particularly those grounded in constitutional
values. Although I cannot develop the point here, an attempt to
prevent the courts from considering constitutional principles in
statutory cases would, at least in some circumstances, present grave
separation of powers concerns.245 When Congress has effectively
sought to do so, its actions seem best understood not as precluding
the courts from considering the Constitution but as either an
exercise of its considerable power over remedies or a restriction on
the courts’ jurisdiction to decide a class of cases at all. But the
241. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864-65 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2012)) (overruling
the Supreme Court’s application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)); see also Young, Constitutional
Avoidance, supra note 201, at 1593-99 (discussing canons of construction as “resistance
norms” that make certain sorts of legislative actions more difficult without foreclosing them
entirely). 
242. Likewise, rules of interpretive deference to administrative agencies change as agency
practice changes. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-38 (2001) (tailoring
the degree of deference to the degree of formality and deliberation in the agency’s consid-
eration of the issue).
243. See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (establishing certain interpretive pre-
sumptions for federal statutes); Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 196, 199 (1993)
(considering the force of the Dictionary Act’s presumptions).
244. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2012) (establishing rules for
construing future legislation alleged to authorize the use of military force). Sometimes it does
this implicitly. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1994) (noting
Congress’s intent that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is to be “liberally construed”).
245. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986)
(suggesting that Congress may not encroach upon or aggrandize itself at the expense of the
independent judiciary).
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critical point remains that canons set only default rules, and so
Congress can always overcome them simply by clearly expressing its
intent. In this ultimate sense, no canon is entrenched.
Judicial precedent presents a more difficult case. We must con-
sider, first, the practice of stare decisis itself, and, second, the
entrenchment of particular decisions. Scholars have debated
whether Congress may override the doctrine of stare decisis by
statute.246 If there is a limit on this option, however, it seems likely
to stem from general separation of powers concerns about the
encroachment of one branch into the functions of another—not from
a notion that stare decisis is itself constitutionally entrenched.
Certainly courts have long felt free to tailor the rules of stare decisis
to particular situations and to set the force of precedent aside under
particular circumstances. Even if some basic level of precedential
force is constitutionally entrenched, that protection is unlikely to
extend to the varied details of current practice with respect to
precedents.
What about the entrenchment of particular decisions? Most ju-
dicial precedents, of course, are not constitutional ones and thus can
generally be altered or overridden by ordinary legislation.247 That is
ordinarily not possible in constitutional cases,248 but the Court has
compensated by lowering the threshold for judicial overruling of
constitutional precedents.249 Moreover, the elements of the Court’s
stare decisis calculus—especially the workability of the prior
precedent and changes to its legal or factual underpinnings—speak
directly to concerns about entrenchment of past practice in the face
of a changing world.250 Constitutional precedents are largely
246. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 138.
247. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (finding that Congress overrides statutory construc-
tion decisions more frequently than previously thought).
248. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47, 649 (1966) (upholding provisions
of the Voting Rights Act that effectively overruled the Court’s holding in Lassiter v.
Northampton Cty. Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), that literacy tests for voting do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
249. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (observing that the policy of stare
decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can
be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions”); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting that “the Court has during the past 20 Terms
overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions”). 
250. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208, 235-36 (overruling Aguilar v. Felton’s prohibition
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entrenched against change from outside the Court, however,251 and
that has made the Court’s frequent recourse to a common law-like
approach to constitutional development controversial.252
Even in the context of high-profile interbranch disputes, the
Court has generally been reluctant to entrench practice against
change through ordinary legislation. The Youngstown concurrences,
for example, viewed presidential authority as largely a function of
congressional authorization or prohibition. Both Justices Jackson
and Frankfurter turned to past practice in service of that inquiry—
that is, they looked to past practice to determine whether Congress
had, in fact, authorized or prohibited the sort of executive action in
question.253 But nothing in this approach entrenched the past
practice against legislative change; even in areas where Congress
had broadly authorized (or at least acquiesced in) executive action,
on government aid to religious schools on account of intervening changes in Establishment
Clause law); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1985)
(overruling the National League of Cities doctrine because it had proven unworkable in actual
application). See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) (“[T]he rule of stare decisis is not an
‘inexorable command’ .... Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment
is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations.”). Casey itself
illustrates both the weight of stare decisis and the Court’s freedom to modify significantly the
rules set forth in prior decisions. See id. at 875-76 (rejecting Roe v. Wade’s trimester frame-
work in favor of a general “undue burden” standard for evaluating regulation of abortion).
251. Nonjudicial actors can, of course, seek to change the composition of the Court in hopes
that it will overrule its precedents. Barry Friedman has demonstrated that, in large part
because of the political check of new appointments over time, the Court rarely gets too far out
of step with public opinion. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009). The Court has sometimes suggested, however, that a change in the
court’s composition is a particularly unacceptable reason to overrule a prior decision. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A basic change in the law
upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception
that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No
misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is
our abiding mission to serve.”).
252. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3-47 (1997).
253. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction
or conjunction with those of Congress.”); id. at 597-613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (eval-
uating presidential authority to seize private property in light of congressional measures
authorizing and forbidding such seizures in different circumstances).
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Congress remained free to repeal that authorization and replace it
with a prohibition.
However, the Court’s most recent presidential power decision—
Zivotofsky v. Kerry254—goes a giant step further. In that case, the
majority concluded from past practice not only that the President
has authority to endorse or not endorse the claims of foreign
sovereigns to particular territory but also that this power is exclu-
sive of Congress.255 Congress could not, in other words, limit the
President’s authority by statute (as it had tried to do with respect
to passports of infants born in Jerusalem).256 The past practice of
presidential recognition and congressional acquiescence had become
constitutionally entrenched; presumably the only way to strip the
President of this authority now would be to amend the Constitution.
The primary analogy in federal courts law is the Court’s state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which derives from longstanding
common law practice a broad immunity against private suits that
is not defeasible by federal legislation.257 One might be tempted to
call this principle of immunity a “gloss” on the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, but the Court has clearly ruled out that interpretation.
As Justice Kennedy has said, the phrase “Eleventh Amendment
immunity” is “convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer,
for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor
is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”258 Rather, the
principle of immunity supplements the text; it is “a fundamental
254. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
255. Id. at 2094.
256. See id. at 2095-96.
257. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that
Congress generally may not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity by statute).
258. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). On the derivation of the immunity principle
from common law principles and more abstract notions of state sovereignty, see generally
Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1601 (2000). Michael Rappaport has suggested that sovereign immunity is instead a gloss on
the word “state” as it appears throughout the Constitution. Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling
Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 830-68 (1999). Certainly the text is not
doing much work in this instance. See Young, supra, at 1624-26. And plenty of aspects of
statehood under the Constitution, such as the basic power to legislate, are subject to override
by a valid federal statute. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001)
(holding state regulation of tobacco advertising was preempted by federal statute).
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aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”259
This is not the place to renew old debates about the soundness of
the Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It is sufficient
to say that the Court’s position is highly controversial both on the
Court and in the academy.260 Justice Stevens has written, for ex-
ample, that “[t]he kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like
Seminole Tribe [and] Alden v. Maine ... represents such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be
opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”261 I submit that an
important driver of this controversy is the Court’s attempt to confer
on freestanding historical practice the same constitutionally en-
trenched status as the constitutional text itself. The Court has
reached “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions,” as it
said in Monaco v. Mississippi, for “postulates which limit and con-
trol” based in common law practice262—and it has entrenched those
postulates against legislative alteration. As Justice Souter pointed
out in Seminole Tribe, the Court’s state immunity cases share the
“characteristic vice” of Lochner v. New York,263 in which the Court
“treated the common-law background ... as paramount, while
regarding congressional legislation to abrogate the common law ...
as constitutionally suspect.”264
I suspect that Zivotofsky, which featured the same basic notion of
presidential power immune from legislative limitation that one
finds in the infamous Bush administration “torture memos,”265 will
259. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
260. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1988);
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 1.
261. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). 
262. 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
263. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
264. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
265. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 148-49 (2007) (noting that the memos concluded that Congress could
not regulate the exercise of the President’s exclusive Commander-in-Chief authority). One
can, of course, distinguish the two cases on any number of grounds. My point is simply that
the memos relied on the theory that Congress may not use its enumerated powers (such as
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prove similarly controversial. Entrenching practice raises a par-
ticularly difficult boundary problem that has bedeviled most prac-
tice-based theories of constitutional law.266 If some practices are to
have constitutional status, then it becomes critical to define with
precision which practices are entrenched and which are not—and to
justify the status of the favored practices. It is often exceedingly
difficult to draw that line, and failure to draw it in a determinate
and predictable way may well undermine the Court’s legitimacy.267
This problem either does not arise or arises in a considerably
more tractable form when practices supplement other sources of law
but remain defeasible by ordinary legislation. That is why it is often
helpful to decouple the constitutive function of extraconstitutional
materials, like practice, from any claim to an entrenchment func-
tion. I do not mean to suggest that all doctrines that both supple-
ment the constitutional text by reliance on practice and entrench
that practice against change through ordinary legal processes are
misguided. My point is simply that such instances will always be
more vulnerable to general criticisms of reliance on historical
practice, such as arguments that such reliance amounts to “consti-
tutional adverse possession,” that it unduly freezes the progressive
development of the law, or conversely, that it provides ready fodder
for judge-driven constitutional change. I consider these criticisms in
greater detail in the next section.
B. Acquiescence and Prescription
The use of past practice in federal courts cases often displays a
second difference from its use in high-profile interbranch controver-
sies like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. In the latter sort of case,
courts often ground the authority of past practice in the acquies-
cence of rival branches.268 The Zivotofsky court, for example, found
that “[f]rom the first Administration forward, the President has
claimed unilateral authority to recognize foreign sovereigns,” and
that to make rules to govern the armed forces) to regulate the President’s exercise of his own
powers. The Court had never endorsed that theory prior to Zivotofsky.
266. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
267. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 125, 170-71, 174.
268. See generally Glennon, supra note 99; Roisman, supra note 3.
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“[f]or the most part, Congress has acquiesced in the Executive’s ex-
ercise of the recognition power.”269 This is not new. In Youngstown,
for instance, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the weight of presi-
dential practice “long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned.”270 Scholars have generally approved of this
practice. My colleague Jeff Powell, for example, has written that
“[a]greement between the political branches on a course of conduct
is important evidence that the conduct should be deemed constitu-
tional.”271
Acquiescence plays a considerably less central role in federal
courts cases. The basic limitation on federal judicial power—subject
matter jurisdiction—is particularly hostile to any notion of acquies-
cence.
[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial
power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception,
which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its own
jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all
other courts of the United States, in all cases where such juris-
diction does not affirmatively appear in the record.272
This means that “no action of the parties can confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is
irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not
waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in
the proceedings.”273 As a result, “[e]very federal appellate court has
a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,
but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even
though the parties are prepared to concede it.”274 As with the par-
ties, so too with Congress: the Court has made clear that Congress
269. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015).
270. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
271. H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 539 (1999).
272. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
273. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
274. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (quoting Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997)).
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may not—by deliberate act, much less by acquiescence—confer
federal jurisdiction that Article III does not permit.275
Many federal courts cases do involve interinstitutional conflicts
at some level, but either the nature of those conflicts or the posture
in which they arise may make acquiescence less salient. For ex-
ample, the Seminole Tribe case held that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity when it uses its general legislative powers
under Article I;276 it thus adjusted the allocation of power between
Congress and the States. But the opinions in that case do not speak
of acquiescence.277 Perhaps this is because acquiescence is more
difficult to measure when it involves the actions of the fifty States
vis-à-vis Congress. Or perhaps it is because although abrogation of
sovereign immunity implicates the power of Congress over the
States, it most directly affects the rights of individual plaintiffs
suing the government. We do not generally look to acquiescence to
establish the Government’s rights and immunities vis-à-vis indi-
viduals. Many instances of judicial reliance on past practice in
federal courts cases—such as the individual officer immunity cases
or the abstention cases—involve individual rights claims in which
it would seem odd to allow Congress’s acquiescence to diminish the
rights of private plaintiffs.278
Most cases involving the judicial power implicate both structural
and individual rights concerns in this way. As the Court recognized
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, for example,
Article III “serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent ju-
diciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government’
... and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government.’”279 Schor and similar cases have held the individual
275. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (striking down federal
statute authorizing suit by parties who lacked Article III standing); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (striking down statute expanding the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court beyond the bounds of Article III).
276. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996).
277. See id. at 55-76 (not relying on acquiescence).
278. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987) (construing scope of
official immunity in light of both common law and contemporary necessity, but not relying on
any notion of congressional acquiescence).
279. 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 583 (1985), and United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
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interest to be waivable but only by the individual litigant.280 And the
structural interest is generally treated as nonwaivable by such
litigants.281
Waiver of structural interests by the acquiescence of institutional
actors is a more mixed bag. In the conditional spending cases, for ex-
ample, the Court has allowed states to agree to statutory conditions
that Congress could not impose directly without violating principles
of federalism.282 But the Court’s federalism cases have also rejected
arguments from acquiescence. In New York v. United States the
Court considered “what appears at first to be a troubling question:
How can a federal statute be found an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the
statute’s enactment?”283 Justice O’Connor’s answer stemmed from
the fundamental nature of structural principles:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract po-
litical entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials
governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals.... 
Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be
ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.284
280. See, e.g., id. at 848-49.
281. See id. at 851 (“When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and
waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the
parties cannot be expected to protect.”). The Court relied more heavily on the parties’ consent
to litigate before a non-Article III bankruptcy judge in Wellness International Network, Ltd.
v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015). But the Court nonetheless considered the other aspects
of the Schor balancing test; consent was not dispositive. See id. at 1944-45.
282. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987). But see Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (invalidating a conditional spending
regime as coercive).
283. 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
284. Id. at 181-82; see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“The
limitations that federalism entails are not ... a matter of rights belonging only to the States....
An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance
between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes
injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable.”). As Justice O’Connor pointed out in New
York, moreover, separation of powers serves the same values of individual freedom. See New
York, 505 U.S. at 181 (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
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Because structural principles benefit everyone, then, they cannot be
waived or bargained away by office-holders in particular units of the
government.
One might argue that separation of powers and federalism are
just different in this regard, perhaps because the branches of the
federal government are coequal interpreters of the Constitution
and (so the argument might go) the states are not. But Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in New York explicitly equated federalism and
separation of powers, insisting that “[t]he Constitution’s division of
power among the three branches is violated where one branch
invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-
upon branch approves the encroachment.”285 Hence, “[t]he constitu-
tional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the ‘consent’ of
the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether
that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”286 Tellingly,
Congress’s decision to pass a law encroaching on its own powers has
not generally prevented litigants from successfully challenging such
a law on separation of powers grounds. In Clinton v. City of New
York, for example, the Court struck down the line-item veto statute
on separation of powers grounds notwithstanding Congress’s own
decision to back the law.287 Concurring, Justice Kennedy wrote that
“[i]t is no answer, of course, to say that Congress surrendered its
authority by its own hand .... Abdication of responsibility is not part
of the constitutional design.”288
Broad notions of acquiescence are problematic for a second
reason, grounded in the general inability of one Congress to bind its
successors.289 As Justice Souter explained in United States v.
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991)); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Constitution’s core, government-structuring provisions
are no less critical to preserving liberty than are the later adopted provisions of the Bill of
Rights.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seeks to transgress the sepa-
ration of powers.”).
285. 505 U.S. at 182.
286. Id.
287. See 524 U.S. at 448-49.
288. Id. at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
289. Although the notion of “parliamentary sovereignty” is generally discussed in the
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Winstar Corp., that principle derives from English political theory
and practice but survives, in a more limited fashion, in America.290
Hence Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck accepted
the general principle “that one legislature is competent to repeal
any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that
one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legisla-
ture.”291 The notion that any given Congress may, through a course
of action or simply by inaction, permanently cede power to another
branch seems to fly in the face of this venerable principle. As Justice
Kennedy put it in the line-item veto case, “[t]he Constitution is a
compact enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot
yield up its own powers, much less those of other Congresses to
follow.”292
Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion in Fletcher recognized that
America’s commitment to notions of higher law unknown in
England necessarily imposed two crucial limits on parliamentary
sovereignty. A legislature might create vested rights which a sub-
sequent legislature must honor, and a legislature’s sovereignty is
also limited more broadly by the requirements of the federal Consti-
tution.293 One might thus argue that acquiescence is simply a tool
for ascertaining the meaning of these constitutional limitations—
not an attempt by current political actors to bind their successors
outside the Constitution. But that argument only works if we treat
governmental practices simply as potentially persuasive evidence of
context of legislative lawmaking, it is unclear why it would not apply to lawmaking by the
other branches of government as well. We generally do not think that executive orders issued
by one President bind his or her successors, and common law decisions of one court can
generally be reversed by a later tribunal. Congress can, of course, bind future incarnations
of the other branches, but those branches are similarly limited in their ability to bind future
versions of themselves.
290. See 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Acts of parliament derogatory from
the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.... Because the legislature, being in truth the
sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior
upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it’s [sic] ordinances could bind the
present parliament.” (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 92, at *90)).
291. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
292. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135-36; see also Winstar, 518 U.S. at 873-74
(discussing Fletcher). Since those constitutional requirements include the Supremacy Clause,
a state legislature’s sovereignty is necessarily limited by the requirements of a broader set of
federal laws. 
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what the Constitution means, without conferring on those practices
any independent power to fix or change that meaning. Acquiescence
would thus merely add to the persuasiveness of a branch’s past
interpretation of constitutional meaning, because an at-least-
potentially rivalrous branch has concurred in that interpretation.294
My sense is that cases like Zivotofsky tend to give past acquies-
cence more weight than this, and to that extent they raise consider-
able theoretical and practical difficulties. To the extent that
postratification practice influences a court to choose a less plausible
interpretation of a provision’s original meaning, one might object
that such reliance amounts to a constitutional amendment outside
Article V. Any use of practice raises problems of indeterminacy, but
entrenching that practice against ordinary legal change raises the
stakes considerably. And much of the writing on acquiescence has
documented the advantage it affords to the more active branch. It
is easy for the President to take actions establishing a particular
practice, but because Congress generally cannot act without passing
a law, it is difficult for Congress to affirmatively oppose presidential
actions asserting executive prerogatives.295
Conversely, political actors may be reluctant not to assert their
prerogatives in particular instances for fear of establishing an
adverse precedent. In 2002, for example, Vice President Richard
Cheney invoked executive privilege and refused to disclose details
of meetings that he held with officials from the troubled Enron Cor-
poration.296 It is far from clear that anything scandalous transpired,
but Cheney would have had significant incentives to invoke the
privilege regardless, lest he set an adverse precedent that such
meetings are not covered. These sorts of incentives exacerbate the
difficulty of political compromise—a commodity that is already in
short supply.
The federal courts cases suggest a different ground for reliance on
past practice. For the most part, federal courts cases seem to rely on
past practice simply because it is past. Federal courts doctrine
incorporates the common law and equity practice because it has
294. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (exception to the general exclusion of hearsay for
statements against interest).
295. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 3, at 448-52; Roisman, supra note 3, at 697-98.
296. See Akhil Reed Amar, Cheney, Enron, and the Constitution, TIME (Feb. 2, 2002), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,198829,00.html [https://perma.cc/6BSH-VGPG].
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been around for a long time and is already integrated into innumer-
able aspects of our law. The canons of statutory construction persist
because they themselves represent a longstanding part of the
process of construction and, equally important, they integrate new
law with old law. And, as I have already discussed, the most per-
suasive judicial precedents are those that have been repeatedly
reaffirmed and applied over long periods of time.
Past practice thus enjoys prescriptive authority in this field.297
One might argue for this authority on any number of grounds.
Burke argued that repeated and longstanding practices embodied
a higher form of rationality, based on the concurrence of many
minds over generations, rather than the limited reason of present-
day lawmakers.298 As David Strauss has written,
The central traditionalist idea is that one should be very
careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were
acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when those
judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.
Judgments of this kind embody not just serious thought by one
group of people, or even one generation, but the accumulated
wisdom of many generations. They also reflect a kind of rough
empiricism: they do not rest just on theoretical premises; rather,
they have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances,
and have been found to be at least good enough.299
Others stress the disruptive effect of uprooting longstanding prac-
tices on settled expectations, as well as the difficulties of foreseeing
297. Even prescription incorporates some notion of acquiescence: a longstanding practice
derives part of its authority from the fact that, despite its long duration, no one has sup-
planted it with a different norm. Common law principles that persist to this day, for example,
derive special weight from the fact that the legislature has chosen not to alter them. See supra
notes 253-60 and accompanying text. But the principal significance of this potential for legis-
lative alteration is as an outer bound to the authority of past practice—not as a source of that
authority in the first place.
298. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text; see also ROGER SCRUTON, THE MEANING
OF CONSERVATISM 31 (rev. 3d ed. 2002) (observing that “tradition really is [ ] not a custom or
a ritual but a form of social knowledge”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law] (“[T]he
traditionalism that is central to common law constitutionalism is based on humility and,
related, a distrust of the capacity of people to make abstract judgments not grounded in
experience.”).
299. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 298, at 891-92.
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all the potential consequences of such changes.300 Anthony Kronman
has even argued that continuity with the social norms and projects
of past generations is what distinguishes humans from animals.301
And still others have emphasized the sheer difficulty of undertaking
anything new if one must constantly reinvent the wheel by reevalu-
ating established ways of doing things.302
I have little to add to these justifications here. My primary
interest is in the frequent critiques of giving legal force to the past.
I turn to those criticisms in the next section.
C. Nonentrenchment and the Critique of Prescription
Reliance on historical practice in constitutional law has been crit-
icized from a number of different perspectives. Frequent critiques
include the notions that employing past usage in constitutional
interpretation results in a form of “constitutional adverse posses-
sion,” that respect for settled authority represents too great a
concession to the “dead hand of the past,” and that—somewhat in-
consistently with the first two critiques—allowing judges to invoke
nonconstitutional practices licenses judicial activism by conferring
too much flexibility on judges. These are all criticisms worth taking
seriously, and any court relying on historical practice would do well
to keep them firmly in mind. The critical point, however, is that
each of these critiques applies most strongly when past practice is
elevated to the status of a constitutionally entrenched norm.
Take the “adverse possession” critique first. In NLRB v. Noel
Canning, for example, Justice Scalia’s concurrence objected to the
majority’s reliance on past practice to expand the scope of the
President’s power to make recess appointments.303 “The majority
justifies those atextual results on an adverse-possession theory of
executive authority,” he complained, because “Presidents have long
claimed the powers in question, and the Senate has not disputed
those claims with sufficient vigor.”304 Rather than defend an adverse
possession approach in principle, the majority unsurprisingly denied
300. See, e.g., OAKESHOTT, supra note 98, at 411.
301. See Kronman, supra note 93, at 1051-55.
302. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 97, at 7.
303. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
304. Id.
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that this was what it was up to.305 And as my colleagues Curt
Bradley and Neil Siegel have shown, there are important differences
between the historical gloss approach approved in Noel Canning and
the rule of adverse possession in property law.306 Most important,
“[r]elying on historical practice to help resolve uncertainties about
such allocations [of constitutional power] is different from allowing
it to alter a clearly established allocation.”307 But it is not that dif-
ferent. Just as canons of statutory construction play a significant
role only when they cause a court to adopt a statutory reading
contrary to what they would have adopted if they had applied only
the other traditional sources of statutory meaning,308 so too his-
torical practice is most significant when it tips the balance in favor
of one constitutional interpretation rather than another.309 In such
cases, practice changes constitutional meaning from what it would
otherwise be—at least to some extent.
Ambiguities plague the constitutional text, and courts often have
to resolve them somehow. Hence, the more appropriate question
may not be whether it is legitimate for historical usage to shape con-
stitutional meaning but rather how past practice compares to other
sources of constitutional meaning. But even from this perspective,
there is something unattractive about the incentives that relying on
practice gives to the various institutions of government to aggres-
sively stake out their positions and maximize their own preroga-
tives. It is rather like allowing the foxes to design the security
system for the henhouse. In this sense—the incentives that it gives
to bad behavior—reliance on practice can resemble adverse pos-
session.
This objection is far more troubling, however, when the rights and
prerogatives secured in this manner are perpetual—that is, when
reliance on past practice entrenches that practice against alteration
305. Id. at 2578 (majority opinion).
306. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 52-55.
307. Id. at 53.
308. See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 201, at 1576-77.
309. Moreover, Professors Bradley and Siegel concede that sometimes courts give so much
weight to practice that it creates ambiguity in the first place. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note
3, at 41-42. That is arguably what happened in Bond v. United States, in which federal law’s
traditional tendency to leave petty domestic crime to the states seems to have created an
ambiguity in the otherwise clear text of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act. See 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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by ordinary legal means. Hence, it is important to Professors Brad-
ley and Siegel’s qualified defense of practice in Noel Canning that
it rarely confers rights of the President that Congress cannot reg-
ulate.310 They note that “in foreign affairs settings such as war
powers, executive agreements, the termination of treaties, and the
like, substantial historical practice supports unilateral presidential
authority, but little practice establishes that Congress is disabled
from restricting or regulating that authority.”311 The Court’s subse-
quent decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, of course, casts some doubt on
this conclusion.312 But the federal courts doctrines I have surveyed
here do have that character—that is, they employ past practice to
supplement the constitutional text and set default rules, but they do
not purport to elevate that practice to entrenched constitutional
status. To my mind, this strikes the right balance between the need
for some source of law to answer questions unresolved in the
constitutional text and the imperative to prevent (or at least mit-
igate) institutional self-aggrandizement.
A second objection to prescription is—not surprisingly—that it is
too conservative. One need not be a Jeffersonian intent on holding
a revolution every generation to be troubled by the prospect of
locking in past practice.313 For example, Justice Scalia suggested in
Burnham v. Superior Court of California that procedural practices,
such as “tag” jurisdiction, that have endured throughout our history
are always consistent with “due process.”314 “The short of the mat-
ter,” Scalia said, “is that jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard
310. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 67-68. As they acknowledge, however, Noel
Canning left Congress with only indirect means to regulate recess appointments. See id.
Presumably, Congress cannot override the Court’s determination of the Recess Appointments
Clause’s meaning. See id. at 1-2.
311. Id. at 55. 
312. See 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that Congress may not require the Secretary
of State to designate “Israel” as the place of birth on a passport issued to a citizen born in
Jerusalem, in contravention of executive policy).
313. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (“One
danger of giving constitutional status to practices that existed at common law, but have
changed over time, is that it tends to freeze certain aspects of the law into place, even as other
aspects change significantly.”).
314. 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”315 This
drew a strong academic dissent from David Strauss, who argued
that traditionalism “is not remotely an acceptable approach” be-
cause it would lock us in to any number of deplorable practices.316
I have assessed general arguments against traditionalism else-
where;317 for present purposes, two points are critical. First, as with
“adverse possession,” concerns about the dead hand of past practice
stifling innovation and change become radically less compelling
when past practice is not constitutionally entrenched. The primary
role of historical practice in federal courts law is to fill gaps—to
supply procedures, remedies, or defenses that are necessary to
constitute a functioning judicial system but unspecified in the
constitutional text or the various judiciary acts. Far from embodying
a “dead hand,” this sort of supplementation enables the legal system
to live and function effectively.318 And with only rare exceptions—
for example, state sovereign immunity—these gap-fillers are not
themselves entrenched against change through ordinary legislation.
Moreover, the courts themselves have modified past practices in
light of contemporary necessities.319
Second, the past practices upon which federal courts doctrine
relies are frequently themselves highly dynamic bodies of law. As
Justice Scalia has noted, “[t]here is nothing new or surprising in the
proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies
of law that might themselves change.”320 Incorporating the common
law or equity practice into various aspects of federal courts law not
only facilitates the ability of that law to fulfill its (frequently pro-
gressive) purposes,321 but it also incorporates a tradition of judicial
315. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
316. Strauss, Tradition, supra note 25, at 1708, 1711-15. 
317. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 697-712.
318. See, e.g., D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This
follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes.”).
319. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-45 (1987) (rejecting argument that
official immunity, though derived from the common law, is strictly limited by English common
law rules).
320. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 144 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (relying on equity to permit suits
to enjoin state officers from violating federal rights); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971) (drawing an analogy to equity to
support damages suits against federal officers for violating constitutional rights).
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innovation in response to changing institutional needs. Even if, for
example, the canons of construction may blunt some of the impact
of reformist legislation, the imperative to integrate reform with
existing legal structures and norms may ultimately make reform
more palatable by reducing its associated risk of disruption. And the
common law vision of constitutional law, defined primarily by
judicial precedent, has frequently helped constitutional law address
changing social practices and conditions.322
Five years after slamming Justice Scalia’s traditionalism as “just
not an acceptable creed,”323 Professor Strauss wrote an important
article advocating “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation.”324
That article rejected claims that the common law is too conserva-
tive, noting that “at various periods in its history the common law
has shown a great capacity for innovation.”325 My point is not to
accuse one of our most thoughtful legal scholars of inconsistency;
rather, he was—in a sense—right both times.326 Both the conserva-
tism that Strauss criticized and the organic reformism that he
praised are essential elements of Burke’s theory of prescription.327
If reliance on past practice rests on norms of prescription, then that
may encourage courts to implement that reliance in the organic,
incremental, and disciplined fashion that prescription celebrates.
These observations, alas, play right into the third and final crit-
icism of reliance on past practice: far from being too conservative,
reliance on settled authority facilitates judicial activism by loosen-
ing the constraints on judicial reasoning.328 Certainly, the strong
role for practice described here empowers judges by proliferating
the sources to which they may turn in construing the constitutional
text, and by condoning the use of practice to supplement that
canonical text in unprovided-for areas. In this sense, reliance on
practice risks replicating the stock criticism of legislative history,
322. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 688-97, 715-24.
323. Strauss, Tradition, supra note 25, at 1711.
324. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 298, at 879.
325. Id. at 888.
326. For reasons discussed in more depth elsewhere, I find the conservative aspect of
traditionalism considerably more congenial than Professor Strauss does. See Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 701-06.
327. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Fallon, History, supra note 29, at 1815 (addressing this concern as an
“obvious risk”). 
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which is that it is like “looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends.”329 Hence, Judge Kozinski has argued that constitution-
alizing past practices “will allow judges to pick and choose those
ancient practices they find salutary as a matter of policy, and give
them constitutional status.”330 On the other hand, the authority of
established norms and practices is likely to rule out certain forms
of activism, such as a reading of the Vesting Clause of Article I that
invalidates the administrative state or a reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment that enforces Rawlsian egalitarianism.
Reliance on practice is like any other modality of constitutional
interpretation, in that it can get out of hand if not disciplined by the
conventions of legal argument and the norms of the judicial craft.331
It is unclear that any theory of the sources of constitutional inter-
pretation can truly constrain courts.332 What we can do is insist that
most instances of judicial creativity remain subject to democratic
checks. It is worth noting that Burke’s notion of prescription comes
from a legal system built on a baseline of parliamentary sovereign-
ty. Both the authority of tradition and the common law’s potential
for organic growth and judicial creativity are tempered, in British
law, by the democratic authority of Parliament to overrule tradi-
tions that are no longer useful or innovations that press too far. This
comparative law point simply underscores the argument with which
I began this Part—that is, that in most cases, historical practices
should not be constitutionally entrenched unless they stem clearly
and directly from the text of the Constitution. As long as that is
true, excesses of both conservatism and activism will be subject to
correction by later legislatures and courts.
329. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 648 (1990)
(attributing the phrase to Judge Harold Leventhal). 
330. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (criticizing the
argument that Article III incorporates the practice of publishing opinions and giving them
stare decisis effect).
331. See Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 692-93; see also HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF
ADJUDICATION 14 (1990); Charles Fried, The Conservatism of Justice Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 33, 44 (1991) (stressing craft norms). 
332. See Fallon, History, supra note 29, at 1813 (“It is difficult if not impossible to imagine
a legal theory in which good judging did not require good judgment.”).
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CONCLUSION
Burkean invocations of prescription have always rung a bit
strange in America.333 Our Constitution is not, like Burke’s, “a pre-
scriptive Constitution ... whose sole authority is, that it has existed
time out of mind.”334 Americans have, rather, a constitutive docu-
ment, whose authority can be grounded in specific democratic
exertions, with a canonical text that can be parsed and debated, and
identifiable Framers whose intents and understandings can be
plumbed. We have this arrangement, moreover, as the result of a
revolution that was, at least in part, a rather emphatic rejection of
the prescriptive force of longstanding British institutions.335
Nonetheless, just as the new American nation adopted the
English common law as a familiar, off-the-shelf set of default prin-
ciples for the resolution of disputes after the Revolution, we have
also adopted a broad tendency to rely on past practices to resolve
present legal quandaries. This tendency is nowhere more evident
than in the law of federal courts, which at every turn relies on
extensive bodies of doctrinal precedents, incorporates preexisting
bodies of law, and employs canons of statutory construction to
harmonize new enactments with past practice. Although constitu-
tional theory is beginning to wake up to the significance of historical
practice as a distinctive modality of constitutional interpretation,
theorists will do well not to overlook this body of law in favor of
more high-profile interbranch disputes over the separation of
powers. Because federal courts law grounds its reliance on past
usage in prescriptive authority and generally does not entrench
practice against change through ordinary legislation, it provides a
healthier model for how practice should figure across the board. 
333. See generally Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 37, at 659-64 (discussing
difficulties in translating Burke to America).
334. Burke, Parliamentary Reform, supra note 22, at 219.
335. See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock, No More Kings, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2011), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=cAZ8QJgFHOg [https://perma.cc/SCR2-JDND]. 
